New York\u27s Workmen\u27s Compensation Law: Problems and Perspectives by Gartner, Kenneth L. et al.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 26 Number 4 Article 4 
10-1-1977 
New York's Workmen's Compensation Law: Problems and 
Perspectives 
Kenneth L. Gartner 
Jeffrey A. Human 
David W. Reitz 
David Saleh 
Philip John Szable 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Workers' 
Compensation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kenneth L. Gartner, Jeffrey A. Human, David W. Reitz, David Saleh & Philip J. Szable, New York's 
Workmen's Compensation Law: Problems and Perspectives, 26 Buff. L. Rev. 637 (1977). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol26/iss4/4 
This Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
PROJECT
NEW YORK'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. THE MODERN COMMON LAw: AN ALTERNATIVE TO COMPENSA-
TION? .................................................... 639
A. Before Workmen's Compensation: The Common Law Tort
Approach to Work-Related Accidents ..................... 640
B. The Inadequacy of the Common Law Remedy ............ 641
C. The Alternative of Compensation ....................... 643
D. The Case for Compensation ............................ 644
1. Deficiencies of the Common Law ...................... 644
2. Virtues of the Workmen's Compensation Alternative .... 648
E. Sum m ary ............................................. 651
II. OCCUPATIONS COVERED UNDER THE NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COM-
PENSATION LAW ................................................ 652
A. The Coverage Sections ................................. 653
B. Overview of Employment Coverage ...................... 654
1. Employers Engaged in a Trade, Business, or Occupation
for "Pecuniary Gain" . .............................. 654
2. The Public Sector .................................. 659
3. The Non-Profit Employer ............................ 662
4. The Private Resident as Employer .................... 664
C. Recommendations ..................................... 667
II. LEVEL OF DISABILITY BENEFITS ................................. 668
A. The Basis for Determining Benefits ...................... 669
1. Gross Income versus Net Income ...................... 669
2. Benefit Ceilings ..................................... 670
B. The Purpose of Workmen's Compensation and its Implica-
tions for Benefit Levels ................................. 671
C. Cost to the Employer .................................. 673
D . Sum m ary ............................................. 675
IV. OCCUPATIONAL Loss OF HEARING ............................... 675
A. Present General Criteria for Compensation ............... 676
B. Exceptions ............................................ 678
C. Compensation Prior to the Enactment of Article 3-A........ 679
D. Proof Problems Caused by General Criteria ............... 680
E. Proof Problems of Deceased Claimants ................... 682
F. Federal Occupational Safety and Health Standards ........ 683
G. Alternatives to the Present Scheme ...................... 684




NEW YORK WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW:
PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES
I. THE MODERN COMMON LAW:
AN ALTERNATIVE TO WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION?
Workmen's compensation represents a radical departure from
the common law approach to recovery for work-related injuries.,
This departure was a specific response to the perceived failure
of turn-of-the-century common law tort theories to provide injured
workers with adequate remedies.2 In response to criticisms that
the present system of workmen's compensation is inadequate,3 this
section will examine the assumptions and findings that initially
supported workmen's compensation and will suggest a framework
in which to evaluate the current proposals for expanding com-
pensation.
There has been a tendency among modem advocates of work-
men's compensation simply to restate the case for compensation
as articulated seventy years ago without considering the impact of
changes in the industrial environment of the injured worker or
evolutions of the tort law. If workmen's compensation is to be
supported as the optimal means of providing for work-related
injuries, it must be justified in light of modern conditions rather
than the conditions seventy years ago. The following discussion is
based specifically on the workmen's compensation experience in
New York. The analysis, however, has wider applicability to the
extent that other jurisdictions have had a similar common law
background and workmen's compensation alternative.
1. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911). "Workmen's com-
pensation is not an outgrowth of the common law of employers' liability legislation; it
is the expression of an entirely new social principle." 1 A. LARSON, Ti LAW OF WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION § 5.00 (1976).
2. NEw YORK COMMISSION ON EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY, FIRr REPORT 19-36 (1911)
[hereinafter cited as WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT]. See generally C. EASTMAN, WoRx-
ACCIDENTS AND THE LAw (1910). This empirical examination of work-related accidents
and their impact in the Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania area just prior to 1910 provides a vivid
picture of the failure of the common law. Eastman was a member of the Wainwright
Commission and her findings probably influenced the Commission in their proposal of
New York's initial workmen's compensation law.
3. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON STATE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS, REPORT,
(1972) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT].
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A. Before Workmen's Compensation: The Common Law Tort
Approach to Work-Related Accidents
The problem of work-related accidents became increasingly
more acute with the growth of industrial activity in the late nine-
teenth century.4 These work-related accidents represented losses
to workers and their families that were recoverable only under the
common law of torts, which required proof that such losses actually
resulted from another's fault.5 If the injured worker or his sur-
vivors could prove that their loss was the result of the employer's
negligence, damages could be recovered., As the industrial proc-
esses grew more complex7 and tht size of factories multiplied, it be-
came increasingly more difficult to determine who was responsible
for an injury." Recovery was further complicated by the availability
of three common law defenses, the so-called "unholy trinity,"' which
evolved during the nineteenth century: (1) contributory negli-
gence,10 (2) assumption of risk, I" and (3) the fellow servant rule.12
4. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, at § 4.00. Exact figures of work-related accidents for
this period are not available. It has been estimated that prior to workmen's compensa-
tion 35,000 deaths and 500,000 injuries causing disability lasting more than one week
were caused by work-accidents in the United States each year. E.H. DOWNEY, WORK Acct-
DENT INDEM NrrY IN IOWA 1 (1912). The growth of such injuries was reflected in the in-
creasing concern and agitation for reform of the common law remedy. See, e.g., Rhodes,
The Inception of Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 11 MAINE L. REV. 35
(1917).
5. H. MrILus & R. MONTGOMERY, LABOR'S RISKS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 190 (1938);
WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
6. The general common law remedy for negligence includes an allowance for the in-
jury, the pain and suffering and the physical incapacity caused by the accident. Hayes v.
Albany Ice Cream Co., 165 N.Y.S. 801 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
7. "[In a modem factory a] multitude of separate operations are united into one
comprehensive process, the successful consummation of which requires the co-operation
of thousands of operatives and innumerable pieces of apparatus in such close inter-
dependence that the hidden defect of a minor part or the momentary lapse of memory
or of attention by a single individual may imperil the lives of hundreds." E.H. DowNEY,
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 6 (1924).
8. "[The advent of modern machinery and the erection of large factories has taken
away the personal relationship between the employer and his employee. As the relation-
ship distanced, the employee found it increasingly difficult to prove his master's negli-
gence." The General Development of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 13 KF-NTUCKY L.J. 20
(1924)-
9. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80, at 529 (4th ed. 1971).
10. "Conduct on the part of the plaintiff [employee] ... which falls below the
standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection." RESTATMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 463 (1965). See Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 220 U.S. 590 (1911);
Smith v. Smith, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621 (1824).
11. "An employee entering employment is held to assume and consent to the ordinary
and obvious risks incident to the employment, and if he is injured thereby lie cannot re-
cover from his employer." WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 13. See gen-
erally W. PRosSm, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAw oF TORTS § 80, at 439, 527-28 (4th ed. 1971).
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The combined effect of these defenses and the complex proof
problems growing out of industrial development was to make em-
ployee recovery a very rare occurrence.' 3
Practically, then, the entire cost of the loss fell upon the in-
jured employee. A two-fold justification was articulated for per-
mitting this result. First, most accidents were thought to be the
result of worker carelessness. 14 Second, it was thought that em-
ployees could evaluate the economic impact of such risks and
negotiate increased wages to offset their effect. 5
B. The Inadequacy of the Common Law Remedy
Because the common law left many injured employees with-
out recovery,'6 these victims often became dependent upon their
families, charities, and society for survival..7 This dependency of
large numbers of formerly productive workers was strong support
for the contention that the tort remedy was inadequate. In New
York, the legislative response to this inadequacy came in two forms.
The first was an attempt to eliminate accident-producing condi-
tions in certain "hazardous" industries. 8 Legislation provided for
12. The injured employee may not recover from the employer if the injury is due
to the negligence of a fellow worker. WAINwRiGHT COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 2, at
11. The fellow servant rule was created in Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W. 1, 150 Eng. Rep.
1031 (1837). See also Farwell v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842);
Sherman v. Rochester & Syracuse R.R., 17 N.Y. 153 (1858).
13. One estimate is that less than 12 percent of the injured employees received any
recovery. The General Development of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 13 KINTucKy L.J.
20, 21 (1924). See also Lewis & Clark Co. v. Industrial Acc. Bd., 52 Mont. 6, 9, 155 P.
268, 270 (1916). This condition prompted one judge to comment that "[tlo speak of the
common law personal injury action as a remedy . . . is to jest with serious subjects, to
give a stone to one who asks for bread." Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 348, 133 N.W.
209, 215 (1911) (Winslow, C.J.).
14. C. EASTMAN, supra note 2, at 128. Eastman found that in only 32 percent of the
fatal accidents she examined was the victim responsible to any degree. Id. at 129.
15. Id. at 128, 129. Eastman argues that the wages do not cover these risks. Id. at 130.
16. In New York, an examination of the records of insurance companies in the years
immediately preceding the adoption of workmen's compensation found that in only 12.64
percent of the reported injuries was there any recovery. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 2, at 25.
17.
Among 186 families of married men killed by accidents of employment . . .
93 of the widows had gone to work to support their families; in 9 families chil-
dren under 16 had gone to work; in 37 families the rent was reduced; 10
families were found destitute; 33 families had received aid from fellow workmen
of the deceased, from relatives and friends, or from charity.
Id. at 27.
See generally C. EASTMAN, supra note 2.
18. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
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Department of Labor inspections and the imposition of criminal
penalties for unsafe conditions. 9 The Public Service Commissions
were to scrutinize the procedures of regulated companies for unsafe
conditions.20 Legislation limiting the length of the working day was
also enacted with the goal of reducing accident-inducing fatigue.'
These measures failed to cure the inadequacies of the tort
system. The resources of civil service staffs were insufficient to
police the great number of businesses to whom the broad safety
standards applied, and the size of fines proved inadequate as an
incentive to improve conditions. 2 What real incentive existed was
traced not to the penal sanctions, but rather to potential civil
liability. 3 However, the availability of employer liability insur-
ance minimized this incentive, since the highly competitive in-
surance premiums were not affected by accident rates. 4
The second form of legislative response was the modification
of the tort theory itself. The Employers' Liability Act 26 provided
a statutory cause of action as an alternative to the common law.
The only substantive modification to the common law theory
effected by this statute was a minor limitation of the fellow servant
defense.26 The Barnes Act27 further limited the fellow servant
defense in the railroad industry.2 8 Neither of these forms of legis-
lative action, however, provided a satisfactory remedy to injured
employees in New York. 9
19. [1897] 1 N.Y. Laws ch. 415 (ch. 32 of Gen. Laws).
20. Railroad Law, 1910 N.Y. Laws ch. 481, §§ 73-76, printed in 1910 N.Y. Consolidated
Laws ch. 49 (current version at N.Y. TRANSP. LAW §§ 1, 14 (26), 261 (McKinney 1975), 1973
N.Y. Laws ch. 657, §§ 19-22); Public Service Commissions Law, 1910 N.Y. Laws ch. 480,
§§ 47, 66, printed in 1910 N.Y. Consolidated Laws ch. 48 (current version at N.Y. TRANSr.
LAW § 117 (McKinney 1975), N.Y. PuB. SErv. LAw § 66 (McKinney 1955 & Supp. 1976-77)).
21. Labor Law, 1909 N.Y. Laws ch. 36 (ch. 81 of Consolidated Laws).
22. NEW YORK COMMISSION ON EMPLOYERs' LIABILITY, SEcoND REPORT 15 (1911).
23. Id. at 8.
24. Id. at 9.
25. Employers' Liability Act, 1902 N.Y. Laws dh. 600.
26. "The only substantial distinction is that under the [Employers' Liability] act
the employee may recover for the negligence of a fellow servant who is a superintendent
acting as such, while at common law he could not unless the superintendent was in
general charge of the work." WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 14.
27. 1906 N.Y. Laws ch. 657.
28. The fellow servant defense was further limited by making the railroad liable
for acts of fellow servants "entrusted with superintendence or control over the person
injured or with authority to direct or control him in the performance of his duty, or
who had physical control or direction of the movement of a signal, switch, engine, car,
train, or telegraph office." WAINWRIGHT CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.
29. Id. at 7.
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C. The Alternative of Compensation
In contrast to these piecemeal reforms, workmen's compensa-
tion offered a comprehensive alternative to the entire tort system.
In theory, it represented a simple, expeditious method of providing
the injured workman with cash compensation." The employer
compensates all employees injured in work-related accidents, in-
cluding those without a successful common law cause of action.31
Those employees with a potential common law tort action are
foreclosed from bringing it and are limited to the compensation
provided by workmen's compensation. 2 In theory, this compensa-
tion will be less than the potential damage award in a successful
tort action.3 3 Workmen's compensation thus provides partial com-
pensation to all those injured at the expense of those who would be
able to recover their entire losses in common law tort actions.
This tradeoff is advantageous to workers in general because of a
reduction in the expenses of court trials and proceedings.3 4 Thus,
a higher proportion of the employer's expenditures for accidents
would find its way into the pockets of the needy workers. The
justification for imposing this cost on the employer is not fault
but rather his ability to take affirmative action to eliminate or
reduce work-related accidents.3
In theory, the amount of the compensation awarded is a
function of lost earnings and actual medical expenses,3 6 with no
30. Hamilton, The Role of Lawyers in the Evolution of Workmen's Compensation,
1967 PROCEEDINGS, A.B.A. SECTION OF INS., NEG., AND CoMP. LAW, 480.
31. "The Legislature has provided a system of compensation to an employee for
disability or death from injury arising out of and in the course of the employment with-
out regard to fault as a cause of the injury." Barrencotto v. Crocker Saw Co., 266 N.Y.
139, 142, 194 N.E. 61, 63 (1934). See also Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 50, 69
N.E2d 557, 558 (1946).
32. "After imposing this new and comprehensive liability upon the employer, fhe
statute accords to him, in return therefor, relief from any and all other liability 'on
account of such injury or death.'" Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N.Y. 49, 50, 69 N.E.2d 557,
558 (1946). Accord, New York Central R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917).
33. See text accompanying notes 36-39 infra.
34. 'WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION RPORT, supra note 2, at 56.
35. C. EASTMAN, supra note 2, at 106-07. See E.H. DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMsPENSATION
35 (1924).
36. "Compensation under the act is not regulated by the measure of damages ap-
plied in negligence suits, but in addition to providing medical, surgical, or other like
treatment, it is based solely on loss of earning power .. ." New York Cent. R.R. v.
White, 243 U.S. 188, 193 (1917). Accord, Christenson v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co.,
216 App. Div. 274, 282, 214 N.Y.S. 732, 740, appeal dismissed, 243 N.Y. 587, 154 N.E. 616
(1926). See generally E.H. DOWNEY, WoaKMEN's COMPENSATION 35 (1924).
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recovery for pain and suffering.31 For administrative convenience,
however, the recovery in New York is based on a schedule that
computes loss of earning capacity by reference to the type of in-
jury suffered.3 8 Since this is an inexact measure of an employee's
disability, some employees may in fact receive compensation in ex-
cess of lost wages and medical expenses."
The compensation received is not designed to replace the
entire earnings loss due to the accident. One of the objectives of
the workmen's compensation system is to encourage the rehabili-
tation of injured workers.40 It is presumed but has never been
demonstrated that if the compensation received by an injured
worker fully replaces his lost earnings, he will have no incentive to
return to work.
4 1
D. The Case for Compensation
Prior to the consideration of any major modification of the
workmen's compensation system, it is helpful to reconsider the
original arguments for compensation. The case for compensation
was presented in two stages: first, an indictment of the inadequacies
of the tort system; second, a presentation of the conceptual justi-
fications supporting a compensation system.
1. Deficiencies of the common law. The deficiencies in the
common law remedy in New York as modified by the Employers'
Liability Act4 2 and the Barnes Act 43 were summarized in four ob-
jections by the 1910 Report of the Commission on Employers'
Liability44 in its proposal of New York's first workmen's compensa-
tion law.43
37. 1 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 2.40.
38. N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 15(3) (McKinney 1965).
39. For example, the loss of the fourth finger is worth 15 weeks of compensation
regardless of whether the employee actually loses any work. N.Y. WORK. Co.n'. LAW § 15
(3)(1) (McKinney 1965).
40. E.H. DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 35 (1924).
41. "Depending upon its structure, a compensation system will encourage an in-
jured worker either to maximize his injury for the sake of economic gain or to maximize
his recovery rate in the interest of becoming a wage-earning productive member of
Society." Smith & Ramos, Exclusive Remedy Under Workers' Compensation Laws, 25
FED'N OF INS. COUNSEL Q. 383 (1975). This justification for less than full compensation
is usually articulated by those who bear the cost of compensation. Since full compensa-
tion has never been provided, it is difficult to assess the validity of this argument.
42. Employers' Liability Act, 1902 N.Y. Laws ch. 600.
43. 1906 N.Y. Laws ch. 657.
44. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
45. 1910 N.Y. Laws ch. 674.
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The first objection raised by the Commission was that only
a small proportion of those workers injured received substantial
recoveries for their losses. 46 This result was attributed to several
deficiencies of the law. One was the "unholy trinity" of defenses
available to the employer.47 Another was that injured workers were
generally ignorant of their common law remedies. 8 At the time
of the Commission Report, a high proportion of the workmen
injured were likely to be recent immigrants who were unfamiliar
with the English language and the American legal system. 49 Fur-
thermore, other employees were often afraid to testify against their
employers."0 Since the testimony of these individuals was the pri-
mary source of evidence establishing liability, their reluctance to
testify was a major obstacle to the presentation of an effective case.
Today, this first objection raised by the Commission is less
persuasive. Changes in the common law and in society during the
past seventy years suggest that a higher proportion of those
injured today would receive a substantial common law recovery.
Under modern tort theory, the effectiveness of the "unholy trin-
ity" of employers' defenses has been considerably diminished. In
New York, for example, the defense of contributory negligence,
which completely barred recovery, has been recently displaced by
comparative negligence." Also, with the advent of strong labor
organizations and public legal assistance, workers are more aware
of their legal prerogatives and their employers' obligations. Be-
cause of increased job security provided by unions, employees are
likely to be less reluctant to testify against their employers. More-
over, with the advent of extensive insurance coverage, most suits
are litigated by the insurer rather than the employer himself.
Were recovery allowed today under the common law, work-
men would receive jury awards which would include an allowance
for pain and suffering rather than limited compensation benefits.
Even after discounting attorney's fees, successful plaintiffs would
46. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
47. See notes 9-11 supra.
48. Downey points out that in a steel mill of 1924, the intelligence of the workers
was so little valued that four-fifths of the operatives were "Hunkies," "Polocks," and
"Dagoes," who were ordered about by signs and were barely able to swear in English.
E.H. DOWNEY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 5 (1924).
49. Eastman, in her study of work-related accidents in the Pittsburgh area, discovered
that 43 percent of the fatal accidents left a poverty problem, not in America, but in
Europe. C. EASTMAN, supra note 2, at 128.
50. Id. at 187.
51. N.Y. Civ. Pahc. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976).
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probably enjoy greater benefits. Nevertheless, the present common
law would still require plaintiffs to prove liability 2 Thus, even a
modern common law system of recovery would be deficient in that
injured workers unable to show the liability of the employer would
recover nothing.
The recent development of the products liability cause of
action suggests that a modern common law cause of action that
would not require a showing of fault might be developed for work-
related injuries. It seems logical that the mass producer who is
strictly liable for injuries caused after his products are manu-
factured be held strictly liable also for injuries occurring during
the production of his goods. 3
The second deficiency articulated by the Commission in the
case against the common law system was "its enormous wasteful-
ness."" This was the result of the uncertainty of litigation which
encouraged each party to litigate issues fully 5 These cases used up
"one-fifth of the time of all our courts in the State" ' and required
large legal fees which could have gone to injured employeesY.
Developments in the last seventy years call into question the
degree to which the current workmen's compensation system is
more efficient than the common law. First, workmen's compensa-
tion has itself produced extensive litigationY8 Second, the demise
of the "unholy trinity" of employers' defenses, if combined with
the introduction of strict liability notions, might produce a pre-
dictable system of common law awards.0 This predictability would
stimulate fair, private settlements without the expense and delay
involved in government supervision. Nevertheless, the remaining
52. Use of res ipsa loquitor could make this proof much easier.
53. See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 335, 342, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 469
(1973).
Additionally, workers could insure against the risk of being unable to recover their
losses. Such insurance would be affordable if workers could recover in the vast majority
of work-related accidents.
54. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 29.
55. This uncertainty was due to the vagueness of the legal tests of liability coupled
with the prejudices and diverse values on human life held by the juries making the
damage awards. Id.
56. Id.
57. "In short, less than half of what is expended by the employers on account of
accidents to employees actually reaches the workmen injured by those accidents." WA N-
WRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 31.
58. For example, litigation over the applicability of workmen's compensation. See
Brodie, The Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of
Developments and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 57, 63.
59. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
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potential for jury discretion would tend to frustrate the goal of a
predictable common law recovery. This uncertainty" would en-
courage litigation, divert resources which could be used to help
those injured, and expose the common law recovery to a charge of
inefficiency and "wastefulness." 61
The third objection to employers' liability raised by the Com-
mission was that the common law system was inherently slow
in operation. 62 These delays produced undue suffering by post-
poning recovery until months or years of urgent need and poverty
had passed.e Thus, the employee was often forced to accept what-
ever settlement was offered him.
Any modem alternative to the employer liability system that
attempts to use the courts will escounter similar delays in opera-
tion unless parties can be encouraged to settle their claims. The
hardships caused by the delays might be lessened, however, by
relief provided by social welfare programs. But since these pro-
60. Not all increased costs caused by the uncertainty of a common law recovery are
wasteful. In some cases the common law recovery may be less predictable than a compen-
sation system in its findings as to (1) the valuation of the loss caused by the work-
related accident, and (2) the proportion of this cost that the employer should bear.
Determination of these elements on a case-by-case basis may actually provide a fairer
recovery than that provided by workmen's compensation, justifying the increased costs of
litigation. A system of recovery which accurately reflects the cost and cause of accidents
will also provide the best safety incentives. See text accompanying notes 70-75 infra.
When the results of such fact-finding become erratic, however, truly "wasteful" litigation
results.
61. There are work-related accidents which are not covered by workmen's com-
pensation. For example, the New York legislation does not provide compensation for all
injured workers. See N.Y. WoRK. CoMp. LAW § 3 (1), group 18 (McKinney 1965). A
comparison of the efficiency of recovery under the common law to that provided by
workmen's compensation in these situations would yield an empirical indication of the
actual "wastefulness" of a modem common law recovery. For the purpose of this com-
ment, it is sufficient to note that a modem common law action for work-related acci-
dents might be considered wasteful in much the same manner as was the common law
recovery for automobile-related accidents. This recovery was partially replaced by a no-
fault compensation system. Comprehensive Automobile Insurance Reparation Act, N.Y.
INS. LAW §§ 670-695 (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
Those who would urge that a common law recovery provided by the judicial system
is viable, however, should consider the volume of claims processed under workmen's
compensation. In 1961, the New York City Office of the New York State Workmen's
Compensation Board mailroom received over 9,500 claims each workday and over 14,000
on Mondays. Gellhom & Lauer, Administration of the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, 37 .N.Y.U.L. Rav. 3,28 (1961).
62. WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 32.
63. "For a workingman's family deprived of its usual income by the death or dis-
ability of its chief wage earner, it is almost as disastrous to wait several years for a
recovery as to get no recovery. They usually stand in immediate need of funds and the
deprivation of those years during which their suit is being fought out may well mean
lasting harm, which no ultimate recovery can make up to them." Id.
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grams provided only minimum subsistence, hardship will only
be mitigated, not eliminated.
The fourth and final objection of the Commission was that
the operation of the common law "breeds antagonism between the
workman and employer. 6 4 During this period, many employers
had paternalistic attitudes towards their employees and felt an
obligation to provide for injured workers independent of their
legal obligations. However, the potential for enormous jury ver-
dicts under the common law forced the employer to insure against
this contingency. The insurance carriers did not share the em-
ployer's concern for the welfare of the employees and would for-
bid the employer from giving such aid, fearing that courts might
interpret it as an admission of liability.05 The carriers' sole interest
was to keep awards and settlements as small as possible.0 On the
other side, the worker was usually represented by a lawyer on a
contingent fee with an overriding pecuniary interest in obtaining
the maximum award. Thus, the common law discouraged any
predisposition of the parties to settle peaceably and fairly, en-
couraging the employer and employee to become bitter adver-
saries. This situation led some employers to offer employees a
compensation remedy before the enactment of workmen's compen-
sation legislation.0
Today, this potential antagonism between the employer and
his employee may not be considered a serious problem, especially
in light of the current national labor policy which recognizes con-
flicts of interest between the employer and his employees.0 9 It is
also uncertain whether a modern tort remedy would discourage
altruistic tendencies of the employer towards his injured em-
ployees any more than the operation of workmen's compensation.
2. Virtues of the workmen's compensation alternative. The
justifications that supported a compensation system included more
than an avoidance of the deficiencies of the common law. It was
64. Id. at 33.
65. Id. at 84 (quoting from a brief filed with the Commission by the H.H. Franklin
Co. of Syracuse, N.Y.).
66. "The insurance company treats the accident as a purely business proposition,
settles for as little as it can at once, or if that does not work it forces the employee to
sue, makes use of every possible delay, uses acute lawyers and takes advantage of its full
legal rights." Id. at 33.
67. "A peculiar bitterness seems to enter into these contests, as both parties are
convinced of the injustice of the law and the prejudice of court and jury." Id.
68. Id. at 35.
69. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947,29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1970).
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affirmatively argued that workmen's compensation provided a con-
ceptually sound procedure for dealing with the social problem of
work-related accidents by: (1) providing an incentive to reduce
accidents, and (2) placing the cost of accidents that did occur upon
those who benefited from the industrial process that produced the
accidents. An analysis of these justifications suggests, however, that
in theory they are better served by the modern common law.
The first justification advanced in the case for compensation
was that by imposing a direct cost for each and every accident,
employers would have an incentive to reduce accidents. This was
believed to be critical in the reduction of accidents once it was
found that most causes of accidents were under the control or in-
fluence of the employer.70 It was argued that where the criminal
penalties of the Labor Department had failed to provide safe
working conditions,71 compensation would succeed. Since the ad-
vent of workmen's compensation, working conditions have indeed
become much safer.72 However, the recent return to direct regula-
tion and criminal penalties incorporated in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act of 1970 ' indicate that the stimulus pro-
vided by workmen's compensation has not been entirely success-
ful in providing safe working conditions.
This recognized shortcoming may be explained in part by
the degree of incentive provided by the workmen's compensation
legislation. Society's desire to eliminate work-related accidents is
a function of the losses incurred by the individuals who make up
society. Since workmen's compensation payments represent only
a portion of those losses, 7- however, the employer's incentive to
prevent accidents will be less than that of society. Whenever the
costs of preventing an accident exceed the cost of the accident
to the employer (i.e., compensation), the economically rational
employer may be expected to opt for the potential accident and the
lower cost of compensation. Only if compensation payments were
70. C. EASTMAN, supra note 2, at 105-15.
71. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
72. "One of the few aspects of workmen's compensation about which there is no
disagreement is the impetus it gave to accident prevention and safety." Brodie, The
Adequacy of Workmen's Compensation as Social Insurance: A Review of Developments
and Proposals, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 57, 63.
73. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1970).
74. See text accompanying notes 30-41 supra.
Other elements of the employer's cost include the social stigma that might be asso-
ciated with an accident-prone workplace (which may be reflected in higher wage rates)
and penalties for violating various safety regulations.
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increased so that the employer's cost for each accident represented
the employee's entire loss would the employer's incentive to reduce
accidents adequately reflect even the purely economic need of so-
ciety for industrial safety. This solution, however, would eliminate
the economic cost of the accident to the employee, who may also
be in a position to take measures to prevent accidents. The eco-
nomically optimal safety incentive would allocate the cost of the
accident to the individual or individuals who could have taken
precautions to prevent it. If this failure to take precautions is
equated with fault, then this optimal incentive would be provided,
at least in theory, through the common law tort approach to acci-
dents.
In the past, the common law failed to provide an adequate
recovery for the accident victim, 7r and thus failed to supply the
necessary safety incentives. Cured of such handicaps as the "unholy
trinity" of defenses, however, the common law may now provide a
safety incentive superior to that provided by workmen's compen-
sation.
The second justification advanced in support of a compensa-
tion system is the characterization of the cost of work-related acci-
dents as merely another cost of production, and so properly paid
by the employer.76 Some work-related accidents are viewed not as
the preventable shortcoming of a specific person, but rather as an
inevitable consequence of the industrial process. It is therefore
logical that the cost of these accidents be imposed upon the ulti-
mate beneficiaries of the industrial process-the consumers. To
this end, workmen's compensation initially places this cost upon
the employer, who presumably will pass it on to the purchasers of
his product.77 Workmen's compensation thereby indirectly en-
75. See text accompanying notes 42-69 supra.
76.
When a machine is injured in the course of its use, the owner of the ma-
chine bears the cost of the injury and charges it to the expense of production,
for which he receives payment as he sells his goods. When, however, a workman
is injured in the course of his employment, the cost of the injury comes upon
him, who can ill afford to bear it. . . . There is no reason that common sense
can accept why the cost in human efficiency and human life of the production
of things that people need should not be charged to the account of that produc-
tion, just as is charged the cost of injury to machinery.
The General Development of Workmen's Compensation Acts, 13 KENTUCKY L.J. 20, 22
(1924) (quoting an editorial in THE OUTLOOK, March 1, 1913).
77. "Workmen's Compensation, as distinguished from tort liability which is essen.
tially based on fault, is designed to shift the risk of loss of earning capacity caused by
industrial accidents from the worker to industry and ultimately the consumer." Wolfe
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courages safety by discouraging the purchase and use of those
products produced unsafely and carrying a higher price.
It should be noted that this analysis parallels the rationale
offered in support of the common law approach to work-related
accidents." Under that theory, it was argued that the risk of un-
avoidable accidents would be reflected in wages and so included
in the cost of producing the product. These costs would then be
shifted to the consumers in the form of higher prices. Under a
modern common law system of recovery, of course, this cost-shift-
ing would occur as a result of the cost of injured workers' claims
rather than increased wages. That result, however, would be the
same as in the workmen's compensation system.
Thus, both of the conceptual justifications supporting the
theory of workmen's compensation also provide strong support for
a common law recovery. The advantage thought to be held by
workmen's compensation is attributable to cases in which the ap-
plication of the common law remedy has fallen short of its theory.
Over the past seventy years, at least some of the shortcomings
of the common law have been eliminated 79 and so the conceptual
justifications supporting workmen's compensation may have been
similarly eroded.
E. Summary
Workmen's compensation has been portrayed as an alternative
to the common law recovery based upon findings of fault. In re-
placing the common law remedy, it was believed that a compensa-
tion system would eliminate the deficiencies inherent in the com-
mon law and also provide a conceptually superior approach to the
v. Sibley Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 N.Y.2d 505, 508, 369 N.Y.S.2d 637, 640, 320 N.E.2d 603,
605 (1975). See WAINWRIGHT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 39. See generally
Developments in Workers' Compensation, 53 J. URn. L. 755, 840 (1976).
Modern economic analysis suggests, however, that not all of the entire increased cost
imposed upon the employer will be passed on to the consumers. Generally, if the em-
ployer increases the market price of his product, his sales will decline. Often this decline
in the quantity of items sold will more than offset the increased market price received,
causing his total revenue and profits to decline. In these situations, the employer is not
able to pass the entire cost of compensation on to the consuming public and will pay
a portion of it himself in the form of reduced profits. In the final analysis, the combination
of lower profits and increased prices will indirectly encourage safety by discouraging the
purchase of those higher priced products produced unsafely at a cost shared by the con-
suming public and the employer.
78. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
79. See text accompanying notes 42-69 supra.
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social problem of work-related accidents. The above discussion
has indicated that the common law has discarded many of its old
deficiencies, and that as the common law remedy has become more
effective, it has approached the theoretical common law remedy,
which is superior to that provided by compensation.
The foregoing analysis, although limited, demonstrates that
the case for compensation is not as strong today as when it was
first articulated. The demise of the "unholy trinity" of employer's
defenses, the sociological changes in the workplace environment
over the past seventy years, and the diminished proof-of-fault
problems provided by the development of such theories as res ipsa
loquitor and products liability have all contributed to the increased
effectiveness of the common law remedy. Nevertheless, because in-
efficient and wasteful litigation would still be part of a modern
common law remedy, one might argue that even today workmen's
compensation is a better response to the problem of work-related
accidents. It should be recognized, however, that the advantage
workmen's compensation holds over the common law recovery is
diminishing, and that future developments in the common law or
the workmen's compensation statutes may eliminate this narrow-
ing edge.
II. OCCUPATIONS COVERED UNDER THE NEW YORK
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW
Few states have enacted workmen's compensation statutes
which include more occupations, or protect more of the state's
work force, than the New York Workmen's Compensation Law.80
Yet, perhaps no state has delineated its rules of coverage in a man-
ner that is quite as awkward, and quite as misleading. The ex-
pansion of the scope of employment coverage in New York has
been accomplished by a succession of "band-aid" amendments
which have created a plethora of exceptions to the apparently
fundamental, but hopelessly eroded concepts of "hazardous em-
ployment" and "pecuniary gain.""' Consequently, some commen-
tators have called for a recodification of the entire New York
Workmen's Compensation Law.82
80. See IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 50.10 nn.91-98, 1-3; 4 id., app. A, table 3, at
514-16.
81. Millus & Gentile, Time to Recodify the New York Workmen's Compensation
Law, 47 N.Y.B.J. 655, 697 & 700 (1975).
82. Id. at 655.
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While recodification of the existing scope of coverage is
badly needed, the haphazard development of the coverage pro-
visions leads one to suspect that substantive changes may be
needed as well. A careful scrutiny of these sections reveals that
the voluminous accumulation of well-intentioned, "band-aid" ex-
pansions of coverage has deprived certain existing coverage exclu-
sions of logical justification, rendered others devoid of clarity, and
left still others nearly meaningless in light of the realities of the
administrative functioning of the compensation system. This sec-
tion will present a brief overview of the scope of employment pre-
scribed by the New York Workmen's Compensation Law as it now
exists, and suggest substantive changes that should accompany any
reorganization of the coverage provisions.
A. The Coverage Sections
Employment coverage is set forth in sections 2 (3) to 2 (5), and
section 3 (1) of article 1 of the New York Workmen's Compensa-
tion Law, which contain the definitions of "employer," "employee,"
and "employment," and which enumerate the occupations to which
the law applies.8 3 The statute describes a variety of occupations to
be covered by workmen's compensation, but does not provide the
criteria needed to address the threshold question of when an em-
ployment relationship exists between the claimant and the de-
fendant . 4 Thus, the courts and the Workmen's Compensation-
Board have applied common law tests to the factual circumstances
giving rise to benefit claims to determine whether the parties had
entered into an express or implied contract of hire, 8 and whether
the claimant should be considered an "employee" of the defendant,
rather than an independent contractor, 6 volunteer,1
7 student,88
83. N.Y. WORK. Comp. IAw §§ 2 (3)-(5), 3 (1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-1977).
84. The legislature has, however, resolved a few specific questions of employment
status. See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAw § 3 (1), group 18 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977),
providing, inter alia, that "[a] duly ordained, commissioned or licensed minister, priest
or rabbi, sexton, a christian science reader, or a member of a religious order, shall not
be deemed to be employed or engaged in employment ...." See also note 143 infra.
85. For an elaboration of this issue, see 65 N.Y. JuR. Workmen's Compensation § 146
(1969), and IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 47.
86. See 1A A. LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 44-45; 65 N.Y. JUR. Workmen's Compensation
§§ 161-172 (1969). The traditional common law tests used to distinguish the employment
relationship include: "(1) direct evidence of right or exercise of control; (2) method of
payment; (3) the furnishing of equipment; and (4) the right to fire." Id., § 44.00. There
has, however, been an apparent, although perhaps unconscious, relaxation of the common
law standards with respect to claimants who carry on essential and normal business
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or member of a different category.
The network of statutory definitions, on the other hand, pro-
vides additional conditions which narrow the scope of coverage
prescribed by the common law tests. "Employee" is defined, in
general terms, as "a person engaged in one of the occupations
enumerated in section three or who is in the service of an employer
whose principal business is that of carrying on or conducting a
hazardous employment .... ,,80 Section three, inter alia, enumer-
ates the "hazardous employments" covered by the law. 0 "Employ-
ment" is restricted to "employment in a trade, business, or occupa-
tion carried on by the employer for pecuniary gain ... ." The
incidence of mandatory coverage has thus been determined not
only by the occupation of the claimant, but also by the nature of
the employer's business.
The "hazardous employment" and "pecuniary gain" limita-
operations. See, e.g., Gordon v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 300 N.Y. 652, 90 N.E.2d 898 (1950):
Etherington v. Empire Improvements Inc., 55 App. Div. 2d 762, 389 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976);
Schaimberg v. Starbright Laundry, 285 App. Div. 359, 137 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1955); 24 N.Y.
Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 179 (1970). See also IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 45.
Outside the business sector, the private citizen, confronted with the claims of car-
penters, painters, paperhangers, or other tradesmen, would appear to have freer access
to the "independent contractor" defense. An employment relationship nevertheless has
sometimes been found to exist in these circumstances. See note 110, infra.
87. "[V]olunteers in or for a religious, charitable, or educational institution" are
expressly excluded under the Disability Benefits Law, N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW. § 201 (5)
(McKinney 1965). This exclusion was given a broad reading in Camphill Village, U.S.A.
v. Workmen's Comp. Bd., 23 N.Y.2d 202, 243 N.E.2d 739, 296 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1968) (4 to
3 decision), involving "co-workers" of a community established to assist the mentally
handicapped. The workers received roughly $600 per month for the support and activities
of their assigned household, including their own living expenses, and were held to be
exempt from coverage. Since the court relied on the absence of a legal contract of hire in
reaching its decision, the same result presumably would have obtained had disability
benefits for an occupational injury been at issue.
Benefits for work-related injuries have been provided for volunteer firemen, N.Y. 'VOL.
FiRE. BEN. LAW §§ 1-72 (McKinney 1962 & Supp. 1976-1977), and qualified civil defense
volunteers, N.Y. 'WORK. Co'%p. LAW §§ 300-328 (McKinney 1965).
88. Employment status has been conferred upon student nurses, 13 N.Y. Work.
Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 179 (1958), and other hospital trainees, the articulated test being
whether the services were performed "for and beneficial to the hospital and .. .under
the hospital's direction and control .... " 24 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 71
(1969). Coverage of "[e]nrollees under work study programs pursuant to the Federal Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the Federal Vocational Education Act of 1963 . .. .
was recognized by the Board, New York Workmen's Compensation Board, Digest of Laws
24 (1967), but not for a student earning $2.75 per hour under an affirmative action pro-
gram, nor for a college student doing research pursuant to an educational grant, because
the program was designed to "encourage and enhance the learning and interest in science,
and . . .was primarily educational." 22 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 131 (1967).
89. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAw § 2 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
90. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 3 (1) (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-1977).
91. N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 2 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
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tions are now, for most purposes, dead-letter language. Whereas the
definition of hazardous employment commences with a list of in-
dustrial and manual occupations, reflecting the scope of coverage
of an early version of the law,9 2 the remaining groups extend man-
datory coverage to a great majority of the labor force9 3 and allow
for voluntary coverage of any employment not specified.94 The
"pecuniary gain" condition has been superseded by provisions ex-
tending mandatory coverage to public employees and those of other
non-profit employersy 5 The obsolete format of the coverage pro-
visions has received vigorous criticism,96 and legislative efforts to
modernize these sections are gaining momentum. 7
The irregular development of sections 2 (4), 2 (5), and 3 (1)
has affected the substantive aspects of the law as well. In their
present form, these sections retain a different set of coverage rules
for four separate classes of employers: those engaged in a "trade,
business, or occupation for pecuniary gain"; the public employer;
the non-profit organization; and the private resident. The follow-
ing analysis will treat each of these classes separately.
B. Overview of Employment Coverage
1. Employers engaged in a trade, business, or occupation for
"'pecuniary gain." Employment coverage has always been most per-
vasive within the sector of privately-owned, profit-seeking enter-
prises. With the exception of employees possessing federal statu-
tory remedies for work-related injuries,98 and employees of some
92. N.Y. WoRx. COMP. LAW § 3 (1), groups 1-14 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-
1977) (containing such entries as "construction of bridges," "manufacture of buttons," and
"work in pickle factories) ".
93. Id., groups 14-a to 24.
94. N.Y. WoRK. ComP. LAW § 3 (1), group 19 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
95. N.Y. WORK. Coa'. LAw § 3 (1), groups 15-24 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-1977).
96. See Millus & Gentile, supra note 81.
97. A. 8113, 200th Sess. (N.Y. 1977) is the most recent attempt to streamline the
coverage sections. The bill would remove the hazardous employment and pecuniary gain
language from the definitional provisions, and consolidated the groups covered by section
3 (1). Various substantive changes are also incorporated. An almost identical bill, A. 11670,
199th Sess. (N.Y. 1976), passed the assembly by a wide margin but, at the end of last year's
session, had not been reported out of the Senate Labor Committee.
98. See The Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1970) (covering
interstate railroad employees); The Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970) (covering seamen) ;
and The Longshoremen and Harbor Worker's Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970 & Supp. V
1975). For a discussion of the scope of these statutes and their conflicts with state laws,
see 3 A. LARsON, supra note 1, §§ 89.10 to 91.77.
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small farms,9 9 the New York Workmen's Compensation Law ap-
plies to every business enterprise, regardless of the size of the firm
or the nature or duration of employment.
The present breadth of the compensation system was not
achieved instantaneously, or evenly. During the experimental
stages, when the constitutionality of the new law'00 and its effects
on the competitive position of New York industries101 were in
question, coverage was limited to the several groups of "hazardous
employments,' 01 2 for which the need for protection was greatest.
However, encouraging judicial decisions'03 and the passage of
workmen's compensation statutes in several other states0 4 soon
opened the doors to further extensions of coverage. Accordingly,
in 1918 the act was amended to include the employees of non-
hazardous businesses employing "four or more workmen or opera-
tives."'1 5 The retention of the hazardous employment classifications
and the unclear meaning of the language "workmen or operatives"
resulted in much confusion and litigation, to the dismay of the
small firms supposedly insulated from coverage.
Forty-two years after the adoption of the numerical exemption,
99. See text accompanying notes 111-19 infra.
100. The Workmen's Compensation Law of 1910, 1910 N.Y. Laws ch. 674, which
covered only those employees engaged in the enumerated "dangerous employments," was
held to be violative of the 14th amendment of the U.S. Constitution and article 1, section
6, of the New York State Constitution in Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94
N.E. 431 (1911). It was successfully argued that requiring employers to secure compensa-
tion for employees injured in work-related accidents without regard to fault on the part
of the employer constituted a taking of the employer's property without due process of
law. The state constitution was amended in 1913 to allow for a mandatory system of work-
men's compensation. See N.Y. CONsr. art. 1, § 18. The act of 1914 provided that the work-
men's compensation benefits authorized therein would be the injured employee's ex-
clusive remedy at law. This act, along with its limitation to hazardous employments, was
upheld in Jensen v. So. Pacific Co., 215 N.Y. 514, 109 N.E. 600 (1915), rev'd on other
grounds, 244 U.S. 205 (1916).
101. See Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen's Compensation in the United States,
11 ME. L. Rav. 35, 50 (1917).
102. Workmen's Compensation Law, 1913 N.Y. Laws ch. 816, § 2, groups 1-42 (cur-
rent version at N.Y. WORK. Cozup. LAiW § 3 (1), groups 1-14 (McKinney 1965). See note
92 supra.
103. See N.Y. Cent. KR. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). The rationale chosen by
the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law
extends to non-hazardous as well as hazardous employments. See also IA A. LARSoN, supra
note 1, § 55.10.
104. When New York's law took effect on July 1, 1914, 18 other states had enacted
workmen's compensation statutes. Between the years 1914 and 1918, 21 additional state
and territorial workmen's compensation laws were passed. See C. HoBns, WI0tKMEN'S CON1-
PENSATION INSURANCE 95 (1939).




the legislature accepted the argument that "there is no reason for
a distinction in the coverage requirement predicated solely on the
number of employees an employer has."'010 This conclusion was
echoed by the National Commission in 1972.107 The Commission
made the following observation: "[t]hat one-half of the States have
been able successfully to cover firms with one or more employees
suggests that there are no administrative factors which make such
coverage infeasible."'0 8 Since 1962, the New York law has applied
to "any . . . employment in a trade, business, or occupation car-
ried on by the employer for pecuniary gain in which one or more
employees other than farm laborers are employed."' 19 The "pecu-
niary gain" language, coupled with absence of the numerical ex-
emption, may extend coverage beyond the scope contemplated by
the Commission, and perhaps even beyond administrative control.
For instance, workmen's compensation liability has been imposed
on owners of income-producing property who occasionally engage
repairmen or other casual employees. n°
The current provisions pertaining to farm laborers,"' enacted
in 1966,1 condition coverage on the size of the employer's farm
labor payroll. If this amount equals or exceeds $1200 during a
particular calendar year, the employer must provide coverage for
106. 1961 N.Y. LEGis. ANN. 298 (Memoranda of the N.Y. State Dep't of Labor).
107. Recommendation 2.2 states that "[wv]e recommend that employers not be ex-
empted from workmen's compensation coverage because of the number of their em-
ployees." NTiONAL COMMISSON REPORT, supra note 3, at 45.
108. Id.
109. N.Y. WORK. Corep. LAW § 3 (1), group 14-a (McKinney 1965).
110. See Riebold v. Doll, 283 App. Div. 750, 128 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1954) (renting an
upper flat constitutes "pecuniary gain," and the owner was liable to a repairman in-
jured while rebuilding his chimney); Reid v. Rose, 281 App. Div. 1062, 121 N.Y.S.2d 295
(1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 880, 119 N.E.2d 588 (1954) (claim of man injured while repairing
picket fence of owner of two-family house approved). However, there may be limitations
to this rule. See Empie v. Cossart, 259 App. Div. 941, 20 N.Y.S2d 3 (1940) (owner who
took on boarder and who accepted tourists occasionally as paying guests was found not
to be engaged in business for "pecuniary gain").
111. N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAw § 3(1), group 14-b (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977), pro-
vides that "[a] farmer shall provide coverage . . . for all farm laborers employed during
any part of the twelve consecutive months beginning April first of any calendar year
preceded by a calendar year in which the cash remuneration paid to all farm laborers
aggregated twelve hundred dollars or more." Section 2 (4) provides that the term "em-
ployee" shall not include "the spouse or minor child of an employer who is a farmer
unless the services of such spouse or minor child shall be engaged by said employer under
an express contract of hire," and that "[i]f a farm labor contractor recruits or supplies
farm laborers for work on a farm, such farm laborers shall for the purposes of this
chapter be deemed to be employees of the owner or lessee of such farm." N.Y. WoRK.
CoMip. LAW § 2 (4) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
112. 1966 N.Y. Laws ch. 646 § 3.
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each farmworker employed during the twelve months beginning
the following April first.113 By replacing a categorical exclusion of
farmworkers" 4 with the $1200 payroll threshold, the legislature
extended mandatory coverage to all but an estimated 20% of the
farm labor force, or 16,000 employees, "primarily short-time work-
ers on small dairy, livestock, poultry, or non-commercial farms." '
The National Commission recognized the administrative difficul-
ties that would attend coverage of all agricultural employees: "the
predominance of part-time help on farms, their geographical dis-
persion, and the fact that migrant farmworkers may work for many
different employers during the course of a year present difficulties
in reporting, rating, medical care, rehabilitation, and auditing." '
It was felt, however, that countervailing considerations-the dan-
gerous nature of farm labor, and the economic deprivation of farm
employees-mandated that all farmworkers should ultimately be
covered under the laws.11 7 The payroll threshold also presents in-
consistencies with New York's traditional policy of unconditional
coverage of hazardous employments in the business sector, and the
broad application of the law to the owners of income-producing
property. Furthermore, the provision gives those agricultural em-
ployers with farm labor payrolls falling below $1200 for a partic-
ular year the opportunity to hire any number of farmworkers for
fifteen consecutive months before any statutory liability takes effect.
In the latter respect, the statute may deny claimants equal pro-
113. N.Y. WoRx. Comn'. LAw § 3 (1), group 14-b (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
114. Farm laborers are still excluded as a dass under the Disability Benefits Law.
N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 201 (6) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). It has been held that
"when an hourly laborer is employed by a genuine farmer, carrying on actual productive
farming, to perform labor of any kind necessary for the continued operation of the farm,
he is a farm laborer." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kabes, 17 App. Div. 2d 1015, 1015, 233 N.Y.S.2d
806, 808, (1962). Perhaps an exclusion of transient, seasonal farmworkers under the Dis-
ability Benefits Law can be justified, but the law is underinclusive at least to the extent
that full-time, permanent employees are excluded. See, for example, 28 N.Y. Work. Comp.
Bd. Dec. & Rep. 89 (D.B.L. Case No. 070-30-4012, 1971), in which a full-time employee of
a horse breeder was denied disability benefits under the authority of the farm labor
exclusion.
115. Report of the Dept. of Labor on Bill Int. 2350, Pr. S. 5461 (May 23, 1966)
(unpublished report available at the New York State Legislative Reference Library in
Albany, New York).
116. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 46.
117. Id. The Commission's "two-step" approach, embodied in Recommendation 2.4,
would have extended mandatory coverage to employees of agricultural employers whose
payroll exceeds $1,000 for the year preceding employment by July 1, 1973, and all farm-
workers by July 1, 1975. Id. See generally Schramm, Workmen's Compensation & Farm
Workers in the United States, in 1 SUPPLEMENTAL STUDIES rOR THE NATIONAL COMMIISSION
ON STATE WORKIMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws 137 (M. Berkowitz ed. 1973).
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tection under the law.11 The proper course would appear to be a
repeal of the small farm exemption. 1 9
2. The public sector. While federal government employees
receive compensation benefits under the Federal Employees' Com-
pensation Act,'20 coverage of state and municipal employees is a
necessary measure for any comprehensive, equitable state system
of workmen's compensation. "Indeed, a State has a special obliga-
tion to set a good example for private employers.' 12'
In 1916, when the hazardous employment concept was still
"the touchstone of the Workmen's Compensation Law,' ' 122 the Act
applied only to state and municipal employees engaged in one of
the enumerated hazardous employments. 1' In response to the en-
actment of the "all other employments" provision in 1918, com-
prehensive coverage was extended to all employees of the state in
1924.124 With regard to municipal employees, section 3 (1) has
been amended to include several classes independent of the lists of
"hazardous employments." These include school teachers (other
than New York City non-vocational teachers), crossing guards,
school aides, employees of a municipal "prison, reformatory, in-
sane asylum, or hospital," county sheriffs and regular deputies,
and New York City aquaduct police. 25 Other provisions extend
benefits to volunteer firemen, 6 and certain civil defense volun-
teers. 27 The general rule regarding municipal employees, how-
ever, remains that coverage of occupations not included in the
original catalogue of "hazardous employments" is left to the dis-
cretion of local government.' 2 Although comprehensive coverage
118. If an agricultural employer's farm labor payroll in Year 1 is below $1200, he
may hire any number of farmworkers on a full-time basis from January 1 of Year 2 to
April 1 of Year 3 without any obligation to provide coverage. A similar "waiting period"
cannot result under any other provision extending coverage for work related injuries.
Furthermore, it was the legislature's intent to bring full-time farraworkers within the act.
.See Report of the Dep't of Labor on Bill Int. 2350, supra note 115.
119. A-11670, supra note 97, § 1, would have eliminated the payroll limitation.
120. 5 U.S.C. §§ 8102-8193 (1970).
121. NATIONAL CoMIssroN REPORT, supra note 3, at 47.
122. Millus & Gentile, supra note 81, at 657.
123. N.Y. Workmen's Compensation Law § 2, group 43 (1916) (codified at N.Y.
WORK. CoiMP. LAw § 3 (1), groups 15-24 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-1977)).
124. 1924 N.Y. Laws ch. 658, § 1, (codified at N.Y. WORK. Corfp. LAW § 3 (1), group
16 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977)). The present section also covers elected officials.
125. N.Y. WORK. CoMP. LAW § 3 (1), ,groups 15-24 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-
1977).
126. N.Y. VOL. FIRE. BEN. LAW §§ 1-72 (McKinney 1962 & Supp. 1976-1977).
127. N.Y. WORK. CoMp. LAW §§ 300-328 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-1977).
128. N.Y. WORK. Coap. LAW § 3 (1), group 17 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
Ironically, municipal policemen and firemen have never been included within the
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has been the practice in the great majority of communities, an
undetermined number of municipal employees, primarily in New
York City, have been excluded from the workmen's compensation
system.129 To complicate matters, New York City public school
teachers (including vocational teachers subject to the same retire-
ment plan) and sanitation workers have been statutorily excluded
from coverage,' 30 in contradiction of the general rule prohibiting
voluntary rejection of coverage, because of the adequacy of their
negotiated programs. Finally, the decisional law holds that pris-
oners' 3' and jurors13 2 are not "employees" under the Workmen's
Compensation Law.
category of "hazardous employments." However, all municipalities, other than New York
City, must pay policemen and firemen their full salary or wages during any period of
disability resulting from work-related injuries. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAw §§ 207-a, 207-c
(McKinney 1974). Many communities carry workmen's compensation insurance as well.
See NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD, REPORT ON FRINGE BENEFITS
AND RELATED PRACTICES AFFECTING FIRFIGIITERS (1974); NEW YORK STATE PUBLIC EMPLOY-
MENT RELATIONS BOARD, REPORT ON FRINGE BENEFITS AND RELATED PRACTICES AFFECTING
POLICEMEN (1974).
Workmen's compensation benefits are treated as an offset to allowances under § 207
of the General Municipal Law. See Devens v. Gokey, 18 Misc. 2d 647, 188 N.Y.S.2d 813
(1958).
New York City policemen and firemen who become disabled as a result of a work-
related injury qualify for allowances authorized by the Police Pension Fund, 2A N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE § B18-43.0 (1976), and the Fire Department Pension Fund, 2A N.Y.C. AD-
MIN. CODE § B19-7A1 (1976). Occupational death benefits are also provided. See 2A
N.Y.C. ArmiN. CODE §§ B18-39.0, B19-7.37 (1976).
129. Telephone interview with Joseph Mastroangelo, Counsel for the New York
State Workmen's Compensation Board (Feb. 22, 1977).
Municipalities may also elect to participate in the State Employee's Retirement Sys-
tem, N.Y. RETIRE. & SOC. SEC. LAW § 30 (McKinney 1971), under which contributing mem-
bers are eligible to receive accidental disability retirement allowances. Id. § 63.
The New York City Employee's Retirement System provides accidental disability bene-
fits, 2 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ B3-40.0, -44.0 (1976), and accidental death benefits, id.
§ B3-33.0 (1976), for contributing members. Membership is mandatory for "all persons
in city-service . . . in positions in the competitive or labor class of the civil service . . .
whose compensation is at a rate not less than eight hundred forty dollars per annum,
and who completed or shall complete six months of city-service after such entrance or re-
entrance." Id. § B3-3.0 (1). Anyone else in "city service can become members if they
agree to the payroll deductions prescribed by the system." Id. § B3-3.0 (2). In contrast,
the New York Workmen's Compensation Law prohibits employers from making payroll
deductions for the purposes of financing workmen's compensation insurance. N.Y. WoRIC.
Comp. LAW § 31 (McKinney 1965).
130. N.Y. Wox. Cobip. LAw § 3 (1), groups 17, 20 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1976-
1977).
131. Reid v. Dep't of Correctional Serv., 54 App. Div. 2d 83, 387 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1976).
For a critical view of the exclusion of prison inmates from workmen's compensation sys-
tems, see Note, Worker's Compensation for Prisoners, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv. 478 (1976), and
Note, Granting Workmen's Compensation Benefits to Prison Inmates, 46 S. CAL. L. REv.
1223 (1973).
132. 22 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 130 (1967); 22 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd.
Dec. & Rep. 43 (1967). For a critical view of the exclusion of jurors from workmen's com-
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The retention of the hazardous lists for the purposes of de-
termining the incidence of mandatory coverage of municipal em-
ployees has resulted in a needlessly confusing and at times unfair
statutory scheme. A serious question of denial of equal protection
may arise whenever a claim for benefits is dismissed under the
authority of group 17 of section 3 (1) .13 In view of the legislature's
general abandonment of the hazardous employment distinction,
the legislative and judicial inclusion of many non-hazardous occu-
pations within the class of "hazardous employments,"' 3 4 and the
coverage of many injuries only marginally connected with the pro-
ductive labor of employees,'35 it is questionable whether the ex-
clusion can be said to have "some rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose."' 86 Furthermore, "home rule" considerations,
used to explain the legislature's reluctance to include an extension
of coverage to all municipal employees in the 1961 amendments
pensation systems, see Note, Jurors as Non-Voluntary Employees under Workmen's Com-
pensation Law, 74 DicK. L. REv. 478 (1970).
133. Benefits were denied in Edwards v. Board of Ed., 32 App. Div. 2d 690, 299
N.Y.S.2d 991 (1969) (business machine operator covered by neither the New York City Board
of Education nor any of the "hazardous employment" groups); Carpenter v. City of New
York, 284 App. Div. 467, 132 N.Y.S.2d 153 (1954) (denying the claim of a court at-
tendant injured while escorting a prisoner); 31 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 103
(March 28, 1977) (denying the claim of a "Health Guide" employed by the New York
City Department of Health).
At times, the Board has distorted statutory language to include municipal employees
within the statutory groups. See, e.g., 20 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 52 (1965)
(rent inspector found to be engaged in the "repair and alterations of buildings," and hence
covered by group 2 of section 3 (1)); 12 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 112 (1957)
(dietician found to be covered under the heading "preparation of foodstuffs," contained in
group 8 of section 3 (1), even though she did no cooking or serving); 7 N.Y. Work. Comp.
Bd. Dec. & Rep. 7 (1952) (civil engineer who inspected construction work found to be en-
gaged in the construction of buildings, and hence covered by group 13 of section 3 (1)).
134. See, e.g., N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAw § 3 (1), group 20-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-
1977) (covering school aides). Compare Leahy v. City of New York, 285 N.Y. 443, 35
N.E.2d 34 (1941) (holding that a telephone operator-receptionist hired by the Board of
Water Supply was engaged in the "operation of waterworks" and hence covered by group
7 of section 3 (1)) with 6 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. 8- Rep. 17 (1951) (denying the claim
of a telephone operator not engaged in a "hazardous employment").
135. The "arising out of and in the course of employment" condition contained in
section 2 (7) has been interpreted to cover several elements of risk unrelated to the in-
dividual occupation of the claimant. See, e.g., Schultz v. Dermik Laboratories, 39 App. Div.
2d 989, 333 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1972) (falls occurring while approaching or entering the
premises of the employer); Lugo v. Pelican Sportswear, Inc., 38 App. Div. 2d 632, 327
N.Y.S.2d 288 (1971) (accidents occurring on or around the parking lot of the employer);
Mack v. State St. Mill Bargain Center, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 1006, 233 N.Y.S.2d 810 (1962)
(injuries occurring during recreational activities sponsored by the employer). In some
cases, injuries resulting from automobile accidents occurring en route to or from work,
or during a lunch period or coffee break, have been held compensable. See, e.g., Marciniak
v. Berlitz School of Languages, 43 App. Div. 2d 703, 295 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1968).
136. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
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to the law,13 7 cannot justify such an indiscriminate application of
statutory coverage. Therefore, the format of coverage for munici-
pal employees should be inverted and provide for comprehensive
mandatory coverage as the general rule, followed by a list of
specific exclusions. The exclusions should be limited to classes of
employees for which coverage in an alternative system of com-
pensation for work-related injuries and death is mandatory. 3
3. The non-profit employer. The original version of the
present statute applied only to employers engaged in business for
"pecuniary gain."'' 39 The Court of Appeals equated "pecuniary
gain" with "profit" in an early decision holding the law inap-
plicable to the revenue generating activity of a religious corpora-
tion1 ° Subsequent legislative measures,4  however, have brought
about broad coverage for employees of non-profit organizations.
Under the present statute, the "pecuniary gain" requirement has
no application as long as the employer engages "one or more em-
ployees regularly.' 14 2 The regular employment of at least one em-
ployee is thus the only condition distinguishing the general rule
applicable to employees in the non-profit sector from that in the
business-for-profit sector. A special exclusion is made for "persons
engaged in a teaching or non-manual capacity in or for a religious,
charitable, or educational institution ....
137. 1961 N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 298 (Memoranda of the N.Y. State Dep't of Labor).
138. A. 8113 § 4, supra note 97, would provide for mandatory coverage of those in
municipal employment "except where a class of employees in such employment has a
statutory program of benefits for work-related disabilities and death." Oddly, the section
apparently does not require that such an alternative program provide for mandatory
coverage, or cover all employees of the municipal corporation, in order to qualify for the
exemption to comprehensive coverage. Specific exclusions would prevent gaps in coverage
resulting from broad interpretations of such exclusionary language, and reflect legislative
control over the adequacy of alternative programs.
139. New York Workmen's Compensation Law § 3 (1914) (codified at N.Y. Woium.
CoMp. LAW § 2 (5) (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977)).
140. Dillon v. Trustees of St. Patrick's Cathedral, 234 N.Y: 225, 137 N.E. 311 (1922),
rev'g 197 App. Div. 201, 189 N.Y.S. 594 (1921). The Appellate Division had held that a
church which raised money by selling the burial plots of its cemetery, and which applied
the proceeds exclusively to meet the costs of running the cemetery, and for other charita-
ble purposes, was engaged in a business for "pecuniary gain."
141. See 1927 N.Y. Laws ch. 234 (abandoning the "pecuniary gain" requirement for
employers engaging "four or more workmen or operatives regularly"); 1960 N.Y. Laws ch.
782, § 1 (replacing the numerical exemption with the language "two or more employees
regularly"); 1961 N.Y. Laws ch. 233, § 5 (replacing the language "two or more employees
regularly" with "one or more employees regularly").
142. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAw § 3 (1), group 18 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
143. Id. Also exempted under group 18 are "recipients of charitable aid from a re-
ligious or charitable institution who perform work in or for the institution which is in-
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The extension of the workmen's compensation system into the
realm of non-profit businesses, charities, and religious and private
educational institutions was appropriate. Any non-profit organiza-
tion with regularly employed personnel is able to finance work-
men's compensation insurance for its employees, and should be ex-
pected to provide it. On the other hand, exclusion of temporary or
infrequent employment relationships undertaken by the small
membership or congregation, which ordinarily would not carry
workmen's compensation insurance, may be necessary to conform
the law to normal expectations and to prevent cumbersome ad-
ministrative problems." The statutory condition of one regular
employee, coupled with an exclusion of "sextons," members of
the clergy, and of religious orders from the definition of "em-
ployee" for the purpose of that provision, is intended to accom-
plish this objective . 45 The meaning of "regularly," however, is
not at all clear from the few decisions interpreting that term. It
has been stated, for example, that "it is sufficient if such employ-
ment continues through a reasonably definite period of time, and
is not casual."'146 A more definite, useful rule would be one based
on a threshold earnings level, as for example, $200 in any one
month or calendar quarter.
The "teaching and non-manual" exclusion, added in 1929,147
represented an importation of the "hazardous employment" con-
cept into the omnibus coverage provision applicable to non-profit
organizations.' 48 Like the exclusion of "non-hazardous" municipal
cidental to or in return for the aid conferred, and not under any express contract of hire,"
thus excluding relief workers who are employed under an implied contract of hire recog-
nized at common law. Professor Larson suggests that a relief worker is properly deemed
an "employee" when the "income from [the] public source is conditional on his work-
ing . l..." IA A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 47.32. Under group 18 of section 3 (1), this variable
is not considered. See 17 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 31 (1962).
Group 18 further excludes "members of a supervised amateur athletic activity" unless
"otherwise engaged or employed by any person, firm, or corporation participating in said
athletic activity."
144. IA A. LARsON, supra note 1, § 50.44(d).
145. N.Y. WomR. CoMP. LAw § 3 (1), group 18 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). See
also 1961 N.Y. LE Is. ANN. 298 (Memorandum of The N.Y. State Dep't of Labor).
The Board has made dear that benefits cannot be withheld from those with the sex-
ton title engaged in the care or maintenance of church property. See 21 N.Y. Work. Comp.
Bd. Dec. & Rep. 242 (D.B.L. Case No. 084-05-5460, 1967); 20 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. &
Rep. 181 (D.B.L. Case No. 065-16-2590, 1965).
146. Adams v. Ross, 230 App. Div. 216, 218, 243 N.Y.S.2d 464, 467 (1930).
147. 1929 N.Y. Laws ch. 702. The original amendment also excluded "clerical"
workers, but the word "clerical" was dropped in 1937. 1937 N.Y. Laws ch. 251.
148. The sponsor of the amendment commented that "[t]he fundamental principle
of the Workmen's Compensation Law was to apply to hazardous undertakings. It would
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employees, it is no longer defensible, and is arguably unconstitu-
tional.14 9 While the provision has a potential for broad application,
it has, in practice, been limited in scope. For administrative rea-
sons, insurance policies are normally written to cover all em-
ployees of such organizations if coverage of any employee is manda-
tory. The effect is an exclusion of employees in only those organi-
zations sufficiently small or of such a nature that no "manual"
employees are engaged.5 0 Unfortunately, the scope of mandatory
coverage has been obscured by attempts to interpret the term
"manual." The term apparently embraces the driver of a touring
car,' s but not a travelling fund-raiser who drives his own car. 5 2
The exclusion has done little to further the clarity of the law or
the equal treatment of claimants, and should, therefore, be stricken
from the statute.1m
4. The private resident as employer. Liability of the private
resident is, both historically and logically, the final issue to be
resolved in determining the practical and desirable limits of work-
men's compensation coverage. Although the New York legislature
departed from tradition in 1946 by extending coverage to some
domestic servants,'54 a cautious approach has normally been taken
toward household liability. The present statute covers only those
domestics employed for at least forty hours per week for the same
employer, and specifically exempts domestics employed on farms.55
Also, the homeowner is substantially insulated from the claims of
"casual" employees, e.g., repairmen, gardeners, snow-shovelers,
baby-sitters, and others who provide temporary and infrequent
services. Group 18, which covers non-profit employers, does not
apply unless one "employee" is hired on a regular basis,15 and the
seem that if the law was to apply to clerical, teaching, and non-manual occupations, that
we are going far afield from the original intent of the law." Memorandum in regard to
Assembly Bill Int. 206 Print 2009 by Mr. Robinson. (March 29, 1929) (available at the
New York Legislative Reference Library in Albany, New York). This analysis was of
doubtful validity at that time. Today it has absolutely no validity.
149. See text accompanying notes 133-36 supra.
150. Telephone interview with Joseph Mastroangelo, supra note 129.
151. See 22 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 136 (1967).
152. See 23 N.Y. Work. Comp. Bd. Dec. & Rep. 162 (1968).
153. A. 8113, 200th Sess. (N.Y. 1977) would repeal this exclusion.
154. 1946 N.Y. Laws ch. 311 § 3.
155. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 3 (1), group 12 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977). The
Disability Benefits Law does not cover "an employer of personal or domestic employees
in a private home unless four or more employees are employed." N.Y. WORK. CONIr. LAW
§ 202 (2) (McKinney 1965).
156. Id. § 3 (1), group 18. See text accompanying note 146 supra.
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definition of "employee" excludes most casual household work-
ers. 17 The Board warns, however, that "major alterations" under-
taken by an uninsured tradesman can satisfy the "regular employ-
ment" condition, thus subjecting the homeowner to workmen's
compensation liability if the common law tests of employment
status are met.5 " Also, the homeowner's protection from work-
men's compensation liability is threatened from the moment he
uses his property for the production of income. 59
The National Commission believed that coverage should be
implemented to the extent that administrative factors allow.
Paying tribute to the "formidable task of record keeping and cor-
respondence" which would burden both the homeowner and the
administration, the Commission recommended that workmen's
compensation coverage be extended to all household and casual
employees who earn $50 from a single employer in any calendar
quarter. Such individuals are covered by Social Security, and
the hope is that "[t]he coincidence between workmen's compensa-
tion and Social Security coverage . . . will reduce the administra-
tive burden on such coverage."
160
Historically, the leading justification for the exclusion of
household employees is that the homeowner, unlike his business
counterpart, produces no goods and services, and thus has no
method of passing the costs of workmen's compensation coverage
to a class of consumers.' 6' In contrast, the Commission found an
analogy to the business sector model in that "the household is
both employer and consumer of the household worker's services
and in the latter capacity should bear the costs of the worker's in-
juries."' 62 However, the objective of spreading the costs of injuries
would not be achieved in any situation where the employer is
157. "Employee" does not include babysitters, minors of age 14-18 "engaged in casual
employment consisting of yard work and household chores in and about a one-family,
owner-occupied residence or the premises of a non-profit, non-commercial organization,
not involving the use of power driven machinery," or "persons engaged by the owner
in casual employment consisting of yard work, household chores and making repairs to
or in and about a one-family owner-occupied residence." N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW § 2 (4)
(McKinney Supp. 1976-1977).
158. New York State Workmen's Compensation Board, Digest of Laws 24 (1969).
159. See note 110 supra.
160. NATIONAL COMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 46-47. A. 8117, supra note 97,
would implement the extensions of coverage recommended by the Commission, retaining,
however, the exclusion of casual household employees set out at note 157, supra. The pro-
posed provisions would not insulate tenants from liability.
161. See IA A. LAasON, supra note 1, § 50.25.
162. NATIONAL COtAMISSION REPoaT, supra note 3, at 46-47.
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unaware of his obligation to carry insurance, and for many casual
employment encounters involving the private resident, this obliga-
tion would not be expected.1' 3 Even if such an expansion of work-
men's compensation coverage were well-publicized, the household
employer would find it very difficult to anticipate any need for
insurance or to predict the extent of possible liability,1 4 partic-
ularly in light of the uncertain status (employee or independent
contractor?) of many providers of domestic service. Also, a national
committee of insurance carriers has concluded that that adoption
of the $50 threshold would encourage litigation because of "ques-
tions as to when coverage begins and when it terminates."'""
It is also questionable whether the interests of many casual
household employees would be best served by inclusion within
the workmen's compensation system. Opportunities for such em-
ployment would undoubtedly diminish if workmen's compensa-
tion coverage becomes mandatory. As a recent Note suggests,
"[v]ery informal, but nonetheless economically and socially im-
portant work relationships, cannot continue to exist where the
'employer' may suddenly find himself the bearer of inordinate
burdens." 06
Thus, the sweeping extensions of coverage proposed by the
Commission may not be desirable unless the procurement of work-
men's compensation insurance becomes a legal prerequisite to the
ownership or leasing of a private residence, thereby protecting the
resident from surprise and uncertainty.T If this solution is un-
acceptable, coverage should nevertheless be implemented for do-
mestic workers who have a continuing employment relationship
with a household, and who depend on such relationships for a
substantial part of their income. In such cases, it is more reason-
able to expect the employer to obtain insurance on his own
163. See 1A A. LAmSON, supra note 1, § 50.21.
164. See Id. § 50.25.
165. Report of the All Industry Committee for Worker's Compensation Insurance
on Domestic and Casual Employees 2 (1975) (unpublished report available at the office
of the Buffalo Law Review).
166. Comment, Development in Worker's Compensation Laws, 53 J. Uaa. L. 755,
775 (1976).
167. The All Industry Committee concluded that "[s]tate law should mandate full
coverage for domestic and casual employees under the workmen's compensation law and in
[Comprehensive Personal Liability] coverage without right of rejection." Report of the
All Industry Committee for Worker's Compensation Insurance on Domestic and Casual
Employees, supra note 165, at 5-6.
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initiative.168 In this light, the requirement of "forty hours per
week" for the same employer is overly restrictive. Furthermore, the
"domestics employed on farms" exclusion, a hold-over from the
period when all farmworkers and all domestics employed in cities
with a population less than 40,000 were excluded from coverage,
is no longer defensible and may violate the equal protection
clause. 169
C. Recommendations
A reorganization of the coverage provisions of the New York
Workmen's Compensation Law, disposing of the archaic "hazard-
ous employment" and "pecuniary gain" language from the def-
initional sections, and the needless lists of industrial and manual
occupations, should be carried out. The following measures should
also be taken to eliminate the major substantive inadequacies in
workmen's compensation employment coverage:
(1) Repeal of the small farm exclusion.
(2) Comprehensive coverage of municipal employees.
(3) The exclusion of teaching and non-manual positions in
or for non-profit institutions and memberships should be repealed,
and the "regular employment" condition should be replaced with a
definite threshold earnings figure.
(4) Coverage should be implemented for continuously em-
ployed, part-time domestic workers, and the exclusion of domestics-
168. Cf. IA A. LAmsON, supra note I, § 50.4 (d) (in regard to non-profit organiza-
tions).
Furthermore, in such cases it is more likely that a household employee's workmen's
compensation award will be a viable substitute for a possible common law remedy. If the
employee engages in this kind of labor for only a few dollars per week, benefits, which are
determined under section 15 on the basis of weekly wages, may be effectively limited to
medical treatment. Section 14 (5) provides, however, that "[i]f it be established that the in-
jured employee was a minor when injured, and that under normal conditions his wages
should be expected to increase, that fact may be considered in arriving at his weekly wage."
For an application of this provision, see Koutsakos v. Larson, 25 App. Div. 2d 590, 266
N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1966).
169. Up until 1970, the law covered only those domestics employed in cities of more
than 40,000 in population. In that year, the legislature repealed this limitation, 1970 N.Y.
Laws ch. 412, accepting the argument that it was "artificial, arbitrary, and discriminatory
to base the requirement of coverage for a domestic merely on the location of employ-
ment." Dep't of Labor Report on Bill S. 4806-a (1970). This reasoning also undercuts
whatever "rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose" see, e.g., San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the exclusion of domestics-on-farms
may have had.
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on-farms should be repealed. Coverage should not be extended to
casual household employees, however, unless the legislature is pre-
pared to require that the procurement of workmen's compensation
insurance become a legal prerequisite to the ownership or leasing
of a private residence.
III. THE LEVEL OF DISABILITY BENEFITS
Workmen's compensation benefits have long been accepted
as a means of shifting the burden of industrial accidents from
individual workers to employers.17 0 Many businessmen and legis-
lators have cautioned, however, that a balance must be struck
between adequately compensating the worker and maintaining
an economic incentive that encourages the worker to re-enter the
labor force as soon as possible after his accident.17 High compensa-
tion benefits, it is argued, often weaken an employee's incentive
for rehabilitation. 7 2
Section 15 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law1 3
sets forth the amounts by which workers are compensated for their
injuries. Benefits are based on the nature of the disability and
the extent to which the disability has reduced the worker's earn-
ings.'74 This section examines several factors affecting the level
170. See text accompanying notes 70-79 supra.
171. See Schuren v. Wolfsen, 30 N.Y.2d 90, 281 N.E.2d 169, 170, 330 N.Y.S.2d 368,
369 (1972). See also 1960 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION ON INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARDS AND
COMMISSIONS PROCEEDINGS 122-24; J. TURNBULL, C. WILLIAMS & E. CHEIT, ECONOMIC AND
SocIAL SECURITY 339-41 (1967); Somers g= Somers, Rehabilitation and Workmen's Compen-
sation, 1954 INS. L.J. 71; Comment, Rehabilitation Within the Workmen's Compensation
Framework, 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 401, 413 (1965).
172. See, e.g., C. HOBBS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION INSURANCE 62 (1939).
173. N.Y. WORK. Comsr. LAW § 15 (McKinney 1965). This article deals only with
benefits to disabled workers. Death benefits covered under the workmen's compensation
law will not be discussed. For a general review of the basic concepts underlying § 15,
see Gelhorn & Lauer, supra note 61, at 3-40, 204-49, 564-626 (1962); Shemel, Workmen's
Compensation Awards for Injuries to Specific Members of the Body, 30 CORNELL L.Q.
218 (1944).
174. N.Y. WoR. CoMP. LAW § 15 divides disabilities into four categories: (1) perma-
nent total disability-benefits received are 66V/% of the worker's average weekly wage
before the injury, up to a maximum of $95 per week; (2) temporary total disability-
benefits received are 662% of the worker's average weekly wage before the injury up to
a maximum of $125 per week; (3) permanent partial disability-benefits received are
66V3% of the difference between average weekly wages before the disability, and wage
earning capadty thereafter unless the injury is due to the loss of a member named in the
subdivision. Benefits for the loss of a member are 662/% of the worker's average weekly
wages for the number of weeks assigned in the subdivision for that specified injury. In
both cases, the maximum award for partial permanent disability benefits is $95 per week;
and (4) temporary partial disability-benefits received are 662/% of the difference be-
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of benefits which the injured employee receives from the opera-
tion of section 15 and proposes reforms to that section designed to
increase its fairness to the injured worker.
A. The Basis for Determining Benefits
1. Gross income versus net income. Section 15 calculates a
disabled worker's compensation as a percentage of his average
gross earnings before his disability.175 This approach is common
in state workmen's compensation systems, but, as the National
Commission noted, it produces some unfairness.!"e The Commis-
sion has proposed that benefits be calculated as a percentage of a
worker's net earnings, taking into account his payroll taxes and
job-related expenses in order to bring the benefits more in line
with his take home pay.1 77
The purposes of this proposed change are twofold: first, to
make workmen's compensation benefit levels consistent with the
worker's former economic situation; and second, to harmonize the
benefit levels with the policies of federal income taxation, partic-
ularly those underlying the progressive income tax and the de-
pendency deduction. Since workmen's compensation benefits are
tax-free, benefit levels based upon gross income are not affected
by any taxation policies. This fact, combined with the progressive
income tax, means that a higher income worker who is disabled
is thereby relieved of a greater proportionate tax burden than
is a lower income worker. By failing to take this into account,
section 15 provides less incentive to a higher income worker to
return to work. In other words, the higher income worker receives
compensation benefits representing a greater proportion of his take
home pay than does a lower income worker.
Similiarly, section 15 does not distinguish between workers
with several dependents and those with none. Thus a worker with
tween the worker's average weekly wage before the injury, and his wage earning capacity
thereafter, up to a maximum of $95 per week. See Shemel, supra note 173.
175. See note 174, supra. This approach is similar to that of most workmen's com-
pensation systems. For an overview of other state systems, see State Statute Summaries,
WoRK. Comop. L. REP. (CCH) (1960).
176. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 54-57.
177. Id. at 56. The US. Department of Labor has published a formula for determin-




several dependents, accustomed to having more take home pay than
a worker earning the same gross salary but having no dependents,
receives no greater compensation than does his dependent-less
counterpart. It seems unfair to eliminate the tax break given to
a worker with dependents at the time he becomes disabled. Since
there is no apparent policy reason for basing benefit levels on gross
pay, the better basis for calculating benefits is the employee's net
pay.
2. Benefit ceilings. Benefit ceilings are considered necessary
to limit employer liability and to provide workers with an eco-
nomic incentive to return to work. They also serve, whether or not
they were so intended, to cure some of section 15's insensitivity to
the graduated income tax by providing most workers earning
$142.50 or more per week with the same benefits. The current
ceilings, however, seem to be an exercise in overkill in furthering
any goal other than that of limiting employer liability.
Section 15 provides that workers who sustain a temporary
total disability shall receive no more than $125 per week, and that
workers who sustain other disabilities receive no more than $95
per weekY.7 9 These levels present injured workers with serious
economic difficulties. Today, the poverty level in New York State
for a non-farm family of four is $105.75 per week, and for a family
of five the amount is $122.22.180 Thus, benefits for an employee
with a temporary total disability barely exceed the poverty level
for a family of five, while benefits for other injured employees
do not even reach the poverty level for a family of four.18
While there is an obvious need to provide an economic in-
centive to induce workers to return to work, it is hard to justify
keeping them in poverty in order to provide this incentive. Thus
an increase in New York's benefit ceilings seems warranted. Were
the state to follow the suggestion of the National Commission, for
example, the ceilings would be raised from $95 and $125 to ap-
proximately $300.s 2 Were the state to adhere to the traditional
178. 66V3% of $142.50 is $95, the current benefit ceiling for all disabilities except
temporary total disability. For that category, the threshold income level is $187.50.
179. See note 174, supra.
180. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL PLANNING REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1977,
BUFFALO LABOR AREA at 41.
181. See text accompanying note 178 supra.
182. The Commission recommends that benefit ceilings be at least 13% of the
state's average weekly wage. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 62, 64-65. In
December, 1976, the average weekly wage of New York production workers on manu-
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guideline that the ceilings be at least 2/3 of the average weekly
wage,"3 the ceilings would be raised to $150. Either change to
New York's benefit ceilings would be a substantial improvement
to the current standards.
An increase in the benefit ceilings, without more, will not
adequately address the problem of the effect of inflation on those
ceilings. If the ceilings are not indexed to the inflation rate they
tend to become unrealistic and oppressive. For this reason the
National Commission suggested linking the benefit ceilings to the
state's average weekly wage.'" A number of states currently ad-
just their benefit ceilings in this manner, demonstrating the ad-
ministrative feasibility of the proposal. 85
This upward adjustment in benefit ceilings will inevitably
increase the cost of employer coverage. Compared to the potential
benefit to the disabled worker, however, this cost increase is rela-
tively small.'
B. The Purpose of Workmen's Compensation and its Implica-
tions for Benefit Levels
It has been suggested that the purpose of workmen's compensa-
tion awards is to compensate an injured employee for his lost
earning power.'8 7 If this is the case, a disabled employee should
be entitled to benefits equal in value to the diminution of his
earning potential caused by the accident, regardless of whether
or not he eventually regains the salary level he enjoyed before
his disability. It has been argued, however, that the lost earning
power concept is a carryover from tort law, and should be aban-
doned for the theory that workmen's compensation benefits are
meant only to support the basic needs of the injured employee. 188
facturing payrolls was $222.15. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BuREAu OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, Employ-
ment and Earnings 118 (March, 1977).
183. The figure of 6 6 23% is used by the U.S. Department of Labor and by the
Council of State Governments' model Workmen's Compensation and Rehabilitation Law.
NATIONAL CONUaMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 60.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Increasing the temporary total disability ceiling from $125 (56% of the state's
average weekly wage) to $150 (66.7% of average wage) would increase the cost of the
temporary total disability program about 14%. Increasing the ceiling to $300 (133% of
average wage) would increase the cost about 31%. See NATIONAL COAsasISSION REPORT,
supra note 3, at 63, fig. 3.1.
187. See, e.g., Marhoffer v. Mfarhoffer, 220 N.Y. 543, 116 N.E. 379 (1917).
188. For a general discussion of the theories underlying workmen's compensation
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Some states have accepted this argument, replacing the tort con-
cept of compensating lost future earning power with statutes em-
bracing an actual wage loss standard.18 9 Under this approach, an
employee who returns to work after an employment-related injury
is eligible to receive partial disability benefits measured by the
difference between his pre-injury and post-injury wages. 1°0 The
worker's benefits cease once his post-injury earnings reach their
pre-injury level. This method of computing disability benefits
hurts the worker in two ways: it fails to compensate him for lost
opportunities for promotion; and it is not sensitive to the effects
of inflation, equating as it does pre-injury and post-injury dollars.
Requiring the employee to absorb these costs runs contrary to the
principle of workmen's compensation that the employer, not the
employee, should bear the cost of industrial accidents.'
Although the New York courts have not directly addressed
the issue,' section 15 of the New York Workmen's Compensation
Law appears to limit recoveries to actual wage loss. 98 At least one
jurisdiction has adopted a lost earning power interpretation of
a statute similar to New York's by measuring disability payments
by the difference between pre-injury earnings and wage earning
capacity immediately after the accident.0 4 This does protect the
awards, see Gelhorn & Lauer, supra note 61; Comment, Rehabilitation Within the Work.
men's Compensation Framework, 19 RuTom s L. REv. 401 (1965).
189. 2 A. LA soN, supra note 1, § 57.32 (1976). Although the author supports the
lost earning capacity concept, only six states are listed as awarding benefits based on this
theory. For a discussion of the various approaches to compensating workers for lost earn-
ings, see 2 A. LARsoN, supra note 1, § 57.10 (1976). See also Comment, Rehabilitation Within
the Workmen's Compensation Framework, 19 RuTGERs L. REv. 401 (1965).
190. Under N.Y. WORK. COMp. LAW § 15 (3) (v) for non-scheduled permanent
partial disabilities, and § 15 (5) for temporary partial disabilities, benefits are computed
on the basis of 6 62A% of the difference between the worker's average weekly wage before
the injury, and his wage earning capacity thereafter. Benefits for other forms of com-
pensable disabilities are based solely on the worker's pre-injury actual earnings. However,
the New York courts have not promoted the actual wage loss theory which the statute
seems to embrace. See text accompanying notes 193-96 infra.
191. See text accompanying notes 70-78 supra.
192. But see Carle v. New York Business Bldg. Corp., 11 App. Div. 2d 570, 200
N.Y.S.2d 838 (1960) ; Connor v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 11 App. Div. 2d 578, 201 N.Y.S.2d 153
(1960). These cases have been read as support for the notion that New York's courts
have embraced a lost earning power standard. 2 A. LARSON, supra note 1, § 57.32 (1976).
In neither case, however, did the worker recover benefits in excess of the difference between
her present actual income and her income prior to her injury.
193. For example, section 15 (5) computes the award for a temporary partial dis-
ability as "two-thirds of the difference between the injured employee's average weekly
wages before the accident and his wage earning capacity after the accident." N.Y. WoRK.
Comp. LAW § 15 (5) (MeKinney 1965) (emphasis added) .
194. See Whyte v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Ariz. 338, 227 P.2d 230 (1951).
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worker who, because of an injury, must work in a position less
remunerative than that which he formerly held, but whose wages,
because of wage inflation, come to exceed his former earnings.
The degree of protection is not what it might be, however, be-
cause the value of his benefits declines as inflation occurs. To fully
protect a worker from inflation,195 benefits would have to increase
as the difference in pay between the worker's former and present
jobs increases. This measure may impose undue administrative
burdens upon the compensation system in cases where claimants
are working in jobs without standardized pay scales. In such cases
the worker should, at a minimum, be protected by having his
benefits continued at a constant rate when he continues to work
in a less remunerative position than that which he held at the time
of his injury.'96
The lost earning power measure does present greater admini-
strative problems than does the actual wage loss measure since
local boards will have to consider the effect of additional variables
on the worker's benefits. Wage inflation can usually be computed
without difficulty by measuring the general wage increases for the
worker's trade that have occurred during his disability. The matter
of lost promotion opportunity is more problematic, however. To
prevent specious claims, the burden of proving such opportunity
costs should be placed on the injured worker.
New York's actual wage loss method of determining benefits
is both unfair to the worker and in conflict with the principles of
workmen's compensation. Section 15 should therefore be amended
to measure a worker's losses by his lost earning power. While ad-
ministrative considerations might prevent full use of the lost earn-
ing power measure, some easily administered steps can be taken
to move in the direction of the better standard.
C. Cost to the Employer
It is difficult to estimate the exact cost of these proposed
changes to New York employers. However, even after this increase
the proportion of payroll expenses attributed to workmen's com-
195. "Fully protect" overstates the case. The worker would be protected to the same
extent that he would have been had he not been injured, that is, to the degree that wage
inflation in his former job has kept up with general inflation.
196. By "less remunerative" we mean, of course, less remunerative than the present




pensation can be expected to remain below two percent.'T Some
of these additional costs will result in decreases in the cost of some
privately financed programs, such as group long term disability
insurance, assuming these other programs are coordinated to avoid
overlap with workmen's compensation. 19
Increased workmen's compensation costs are not an unmiti-
gated evil. Such cost increases ultimately increase the cost to the
manufacturer of hazardous working conditions, thereby increasing
the economic incentive for safety. 9 To the extent that such cost
increases make the prospect of rehabilitating a worker econom-
ically more attractive than keeping him on compensation bene-
fits, the higher costs may serve society as well as the worker. Since
rehabilitation is now largely underemphasized as a goal of work-
men's compensation programs, 20 the cost increases may help to
redirect New York's program in a constructive way. In assessing
the cost increases implicit in the proposed reforms, it should be
remembered that these increases are nothing more than a shift
of the economic consequences of accidents from the worker to the
employer. They are not a distortion of the economies of industrial
production and thus do not represent an unfair burden to the em-
ployer or to the eventual consumers of their products.
It may be politically infeasible for the New York legislature
to effect a significant increase in workmen's compensation benefits
at a time when businesses are already leaving New York because
of the high overhead of doing business in the state. Yet it seems
unfair to try to create a favorable business climate in New York
at the expense of the state's disabled workers. If in fact an appro-
priate increase in benefit levels is infeasible, then the state should
advocate the implementation of a federal minimum standard for
workmen's compensation statutes.0 Such a solution was necessary
197. Accord, NATIONAL COAMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 145, table B.2.
198. Avoidance of double recovery is necessary to maintain an economic incentive
for a disabled worker to return to work. Generally, workmen's compensation should be
the primary source of recovery, since the program's costs provide an incentive for in-
dustrial safety. See notes 70-75 supra & accompanying text. This is even more true in the
case of overlap with public assistance programs, since another objective of the workmen's
compensation program is to place the cost of industrial accidents upon the manufacturer
and, ultimately, the consumer, rather than upon the public coffers. See notes 76-78 supra
& accompanying text.
199. See notes 70-78 supra & accompanying text.
200. J. TURNBULL, C. WILLIAMs, & E. CHErr, supra note 171 at 286-87 (1967).
201. Such legislation has already been proposed. See the National Workmen's Com.
pensation Act of 1975, S. 2018, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.; text accompanying notes 257-87 infra.
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to establish a minimum wage and standards for child labor, and
may now be necessary in the field of workmen's compensation bene-
fits.
D. Summary
Section 15 of the New York Workmen's Compensation Law
should be amended so that benefits are based on the worker's net
earnings. This reform would make benefits more accurately re-
flect the employee's economic loss. The statute should also be
amended so that benefits are based upon lost earning power, not
actual wage loss. Finally, the benefit ceiling should be substantially
increased and indexed to the state's average weekly wage to help
reduce the impact of inflation upon recipients of workmen's com-
pensation benefits.
It is unlikely that the cost increases that these reforms would
entail will substantially impair New York's ability to retain and
to attract businesses, given the relatively small percentage of pay-
roll costs attributable to workmen's compensation premiums. If
the effect of these cost increases is more substantial than we esti-
mate, however, New York should advocate adoption of federal
minimum benefit levels rather than victimize disabled workers in
order to remain competitive with other states.
IV. OCCUPATIONAL Loss OF HEARING
New York's Workmen's Compensation Law is not a compre-
hensive code, but rather is a patchwork consisting of the original
statute and over 500 added provisions and amendments. Many of
the additions were shaped by the pragmatic judgments of their
lobbyists, within then existing limitations on medical and engi-
neering knowledge and job safety standards. Thus, the additions
made political and practical sense when they were adopted. Politi-
cal expediencies, technical limitations, and regulatory require-
ments change as time passes, however, and new considerations often
make old concerns irrelevant. Meanwhile, the shortcomings en-
gendered by those concerns now unnecessarily delay and sometimes
prevent recovery of compensation awards by injured workers.
Article 3-A of the New York State Workmen's Compensation
Law, which covers occupational loss of hearing, was enacted in
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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
July, 1958.2 This section examines its present coverage and rel-
evant history. Also considered are the proof problems claimants
face arising out of the medical realities of industrial deafness, and
the concurrent effect of certain other state and federal regulations
bearing on the subject. Specifically, the efficacy of the statutory
waiting period2 3 will be considered in light of these factors. The
regulation of hearing loss claims suggests that the workmen's com-
pensation system, under rules designed to promote efficiency and
economy, often unfairly deprives workers of a deserved recovery.
A. Present General Criteria for Compensation
Compensation for loss of hearing resulting from continued
exposure to industrial noise is available subject to the conditions
imposed by article 3-A.204 The article requires a ninety-day mini-
mum exposure to harmful noise before a claimant is entitled to an
award, and therefore does not cover hearing loss due to a traumatic
incident, such as an explosion.0 5 Thus, "occupational hearing
loss" can be defined as that loss incurred over a sustained period
of exposure to noise.
The determination of criteria and standards for the measure-
ment of occupational loss of hearing has been substantially dele-
gated to a committee of expert consultants appointed by the chair-
man of the Workmen's Compensation Board.20 Although the Board
is empowered, after considering the findings and recommendations
of the committee, to adopt its own rules prescribing the risk cri-
teria and loss measurement standards, 20 7 it has adopted the com-
mittee's recommendations in their entirety.20 Current regulations
provide that the loss of the ability to understand speech is the
primary basis for awards.0 9 Proper reports must be made by the
202. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 49-aa to 49-gg (McKinney 1965).
203. Id. § 49-bb.
204. Id. § 49-aa.
205. Id. § 49-ff. Traumatic hearing loss caused accidentally in the course of employ-
ment is compensable under section 10 as an injury.
206. N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAw § 49-gg (McKinney 1965). This delegation of authority,
and article 3-A itself, were held unconstitutional in Gormley v. New York Daily News, S0
App. Div. 2d 16, 289 N.Y.S.2d 506 (1968), afJ'd, 24 N.Y.2d 867, 248 N.E.2d 924, 301 N.Y.S.2d
97 (1969).
207. N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 49-gg (McKinney 1965).
208. 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.1, 1960 Report of Consultants on Industrial Noise and Oc-
cupational Loss of Hearing (1974).
209. Id., 1953 Report on Industrial Loss of Hearing, Answer to Question 4.
Losses of hearing for the tones of high frequencies that do not affect the
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examining otologist so that the possible effect of non-industrial
causes of hearing impairment, other than presbycusis,210 may be
considered by the Board in fixing the amount of the award. 1 Non-
industrial causes of hearing impairment include congenital de-
formities, 212 childhood diseases,2 13 and accidents.
Section 49-bb provides that the date of disablement shall be
that day six months after the claimant has terminated employ-
ment with the defendant employer, provided that the claimant is
not exposed to harmful noise in his current position.214 Further-
more, the Board has no discretion in setting the date of disable-
ment.215 This distinguishes article 3-A from article 3, which covers
occupational diseases in general.216 Under article 3, the Board may
determine the date of disablement as a matter of fact, subject only
to the substantial evidence rule.217
A claimant must be removed from excessive noise at least
six months before an accurate assessment of the permanency of
any hearing loss can be made.218 Auditory fatigue (temporary loss
understanding of speech should be given consideration, in the making of awards,
only in those rare instances in which the claimant has customarily worked at
tasks for which good hearing for tones of those high frequencies is a prerequisite
for employment.
Id.
210. Presbycusis is the "normal or physiological loss of hearing with advancing
age." J. SATALOFF, INDUSTRIAL DEAFNESS, 248 (1957).
The regulation specifically requires that no allowance be made for 'presbycusis. 12
N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.1, 1960 Report of the Committee of Consultants on Industrial Noise
and Occupational Loss of Hearing, Answer to Question 5 (1974).
211. 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.1, 1960 Report of the Committee of Consultants on Indus-
trial Noise and Occupational Loss of Hearing, Answer to Question 5 (1974).
212. Cf., Raskoff v. Long Island Daily Press,, 38 App. Div. 2d 644, 327 N.Y.S.2d 398
(1971).
213. Cf., Dendel v. R. Hoe & Co., 50 App. Div. 2d 625, 374 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1975).
214. N.Y. WORK. CoasP. LAw § 49-bb (McKinney 1965) provides in pertinent part:
[C]ompensation for occupational loss of hearing shall become due and payable
six months after separation from work from the last employer in whose employ-
ment the employee was at any time during such employment exposed to harmful
noise, and the last day of such period of separation from work shall be the date
of disablement.
215. DiMatteo v. T.M. Duche 8= Son, 33 App. Div. 2d 1089, 307 N.Y.S.2d 995 (1970).
216. N.Y. WoR. CoRsP. LAW §§ 37 to 49-a (McKinney 1965). Before July 1, 1958,
occupational hearing loss claims were subject to the provisions of article 3, Occupational
Diseases.
217. Id. § 42; Ciavarro v. Despatch Shops, Inc., 22 App. Div. 2d 312, 255 N.Y.S.2d 48
(1964).




due to noise exposure) may skew the results of any audiometric
examinations. 219 This temporary loss completely subsides after a
six-month absence from harmful noise. Although no provision of
article 3-A specifically limits compensation to permanent loss alone,
the six-month waiting period of 49-bb effectively makes compen-
sable only permanent occupational hearing loss.
2 20
B. Exceptions
There are two general exceptions to section 49-bb. Section
49-dd permits a claimant's surviving spouse, children, or estate
to pursue his claim if he dies before he has been away from harm-
ful noise for six months.221 It is clear that 49-dd eliminates the six-
month waiting period of 49-bb. However, it is unclear whether the
49-bb "separated from work" condition survives the effect of 49-dd,
or is eliminated as well. It is possible to read 49-dd as applying
only if the deceased claimant had terminated his employment
prior to his death. Alternatively, the language of 49-dd can be read
as eliminating the need for a prior separation from employment.
22
Thus, a claim on behalf of a deceased worker would be valid even
though he was exposed to harmful noise at the time of his death.
The second exception to 49-bb operates when the claimant is
currently exposed to occupational noise in another jurisdiction.
In Russel v. Union Forging Co.,2m claimant was exposed to harm-
ful noise in New York State for twenty-two years before moving to
New Jersey and engaging in work which entailed continued harm-
ful noise exposure. The Board allowed the claim even though he
had never been removed from exposure to harmful noise. The
Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the phrase "last em-
219. J. SATALOFF, supra note 210, at 239.
220. The appellate division has said, "The purpose and effect of [49-bb] . .. [were]
quite evidently to provide a period of time away from the noisy environment so as to
permit accurate appraisal of the supposed hearing loss." McGoldrick v. New York Post, 20
App. Div. 2d 595, 245 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1963). See notes 228-29 infra & accompanying text.
221. N.Y. WORK. CoMiP. LAW § 49-dd (McKinney 1965) provides in pertinent part:
If an employee shall die before he shall have been removed from exposure
to harmful noise for a period of at least six consecutive months as hereinbefore
provided, an award may be payable . . . and such award shall not be barred by
the fact that the deceased shall not have been removed from harmful noise for
a period of at least six consecutive months.
222. The latter reading has more support in the language of 49-dd, since the phrase
"removed from exposure ... as hereinbefore provided" doubtless refers to the separation
from work requirement of 49-bb. See notes 244-45 infra & accompanying text.




ployer" in section 49-bb means the last employer subject to the
jurisdiction of the New York Workmen's Compensation Board.
C. Compensation Prior to the Enactment of Article 3-A
Although the primary purpose of the six-month waiting pe-
riod was to eliminate inaccurate test results due to auditory fatigue,
prior history of article 3-A indicates that some proponents of the
waiting period also sought to discourage the filing of meritorious
claims.
In 1948, the New York Court of Appeals held, in Slawinski
v. J.H. Williams & Co.,224 that an award for hearing impairment
was not dependent upon a showing of earnings loss. The Board
found that the claimant had suffered a hearing loss of 43.6 percent
in his right ear and 45 percent in his left. Further, it ruled this
loss to be an occupational disease within the meaning of the Work-
men's Compensation Law.225 On appeal, the employer argued that
the claimant suffered no disability under section 37 since his
earning power was not affected.226 The Board asserted that no such
showing was necessary. The court's decision marked the first time
an award was allowed in an occupational disease case without lost
time or loss of earnings. The decision resulted in the filing of a
large number of claims for hearing loss compensation. Since hear-
ing loss was not previously considered compensable, this develop-
ment found industry and insurance carriers without sufficient re-
serves to pay awards..
22 7
An administrative directive, issued by the Board shortly after
Slawinski, ordered that no compensation be paid unless the claim-
ant had proof of a permanent hearing defect.228 Since permanence
cannot be established until the claimant has been withdrawn from
noise for six months, the directive presented a substantial obstacle
to the presentment of a claim.
Three years before the enactment of article 3-A, legislation
was introduced which would have required the claimant to show
224. 298 N.Y. 546, 84 N.E. 93 (1948).
225. Id. at 547, 84 N.E. at 94.
226. N.Y. WoR. CoMP. LAw § 37 (1) (McKinney 1965) provides: "'Disability' means
the state of being disabled from earning full wages at the work at which the employee
was last employed."
227. Williams, Medicolegal Aspects, in J. SATALOFF, supra note 210, at 53.
228. Id. at 53-54.
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an actual wage loss before an award could be made.20 Industry
lobbyists urged that without some corrective legislation, the cost
of hearing loss awards in New York State would run into billions
of dollars.m° They argued that since ten percent of the population
suffered some degree of hearing impairment, however caused, and
since it was easy for claimants to argue that all noise levels above
ninety decibels were harmful,2 1 it was almost impossible to defend
a hearing loss claim. This was particularly true given the statutory
presumption of a claim's validity,22 and the considerable differ-
ences of opinion among medical and scientific experts. The pro-
posed legislation was never passed, but the enactment of section
49-bb in 1958 effectively gave the lobbyists what they sought.
Professor Arthur Larson, a leading authority on workmen's
compensation, suggests that the improbability that an employee
will leave his job to wait for a period of six months without pay
merely to establish a claim for occupational hearing loss supports
the conclusion that the six-month waiting period was designed to
keep the rush of claims away permanently. 233 Regardless of this
intention, however, he asserts that for two reasons the waiting
period was not unfair to claimants. First, the claimant's rights
were preserved, "to be vindicated at an appropriate later time."
Second, the lure of a possible award may induce some employees
to remove themselves from harmful exposure. =4 It is difficult to
reconcile this second assertion with Professor Larson's earlier
observation that employees would generally have no incentive to
leave their present employment.
D. Proof Problems Caused by Present Criteria
Medical and scientific literature support the position that
auditory fatigue does substantially skew the results of tests to
229. See Symons, Legal Aspects of Industrial Noise and Occupational Deafness, 1955
INS. L.J. 39. (Mr. Symons was counsel to the appellant in Slawinski.)
230. Id. at 40.
231. Id.
232. N.Y. WORK. Co,,p. LAw § 21 (McKinney 1965) provides: "In any proceeding for
the enforcement of a claim for compensation under this chapter, it shall be presumed in
the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary . .. [t]hat the claim comes within the
provision of this chapter..."




determine permanent hearing loss.2 35 The temporary shift in hear-
ing level which occurs when an individual is subjected to harmful
noise may or may not become permanent, but both temporary
and permanent loss initially affect perception of high frequency
tones and gradually involve lower frequencies as damage becomes
more extensive.m6
In enacting 49-bb, the legislature built in an additional loss
measurement problem. Assuming that a large number of in-
dividuals will stay in one particular trade, commonly exposing
them to noise throughout their working careers, and that a sub-
stantial number will remain with one employer until retirement,
claims will not normally be filed until approximately six months
after the claimant retires.23 As previously noted,238 presbycusis is
that loss of hearing that accompanies advancing age. Although it
is not formally recognized as a mitigating factor in hearing loss
claims,2 9 grave proof problems can arise with a claim filed by an
older person. The problem is that presbycusis and industrial deaf-
ness are practically indistinguishable.2 40 Another complicating fac-
tor is presented by the fact that presbycusis progresses at different
rates for different individuals. A forty-five year old person may
have as much loss due to presbycusis as is commonly found in a
seventy-five year old person.241 Precise determination of the amount
235. See note 219 supra.
"Absolute permanency must be established by periodical audiometric examinations
after removal from noise, since absence from noise may result in minor improvements in
hearing acuity over a period of weeks or months." W. BuRNs, NoISE AND MAN 214 n.1
(2d ed. 1973).
236. The perceptive type of acoustic trauma . . . is generally termed occupa-
tional or industrial deafness. This may . . . be subdivided into two types-tem-
porary (auditory fatigue) and permanent deafness .... In the early stages of
industrial deafness, the first evidence of hearing loss is usually evident in the
region of 4,000 cycles . . . After the 4,000-cycle tone is affected, and as the dam-
aging noise continues and causes further hearing loss, the frequencies just above
and below 4,000 cycles begin to become involved. The damage can become so
severe as also to involve the lower tones, even as low as 250 cycles and below.
J. SATALOFF, supra note 209, at 40.
237. This conclusion is reinforced when it is noted that the annual amount of pen-
sion benefits to be paid a retiree increases directly with job seniority. An employee who
has some vested pension rights has no incentive to leave work without pay and relinquish
his pension rights merely to satisfy the waiting period for filing a claim.
238. See note 210 supra.
239. Id.
240. "[B]oth presbycusis and industrial deafness occur in adults, both are char-
acterized by high tone hearing loss, and neither presents any known distinguishing fea-
tures during a physical examination of the ears." J. SATALOFF, supra note 210, at 250.
241. Id. at 248-49.
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of presbycusis loss in any individual is impossible. However, there
is a way for a claimant to approximate the amount of industrial
related loss. The claimant could obtain expert testimony establish-
ing his maximum conceivable presbycusis loss. He could then
argue that any loss beyond this maximum is attributable to occupa-
tional noise exposure.242 The main difficulty is finding a credible
expert who will agree to testify for the forty-five dollar fee pre-
scribed by regulations. 43
If the defendant demonstrates that the alleged percentage loss
approximates the maximum losses generally caused by presbycusis,
he may have overcome the statutory presumption of validity.2 1
This may result in the claim's disallowance because of insufficient
evidence of occupational causation. In such cases, a claimant will
lose unless he can advance expert testimony on his behalf.
E. Proof Problems of Deceased Claimants
The elimination of the waiting period 24 5 in 49-dd may have
the effect of allowing recovery for some amount of temporary
hearing loss by those pursuing the deceased's claim. This contrasts
with the claimant who lives through the six-month waiting period
and recovers only for permanent loss. 240 Any audiometric tests
made prior to the employee's death, while he was still exposed to
harmful noise, will reflect some loss due to auditory fatigue. While
no provision bars an award based on proof of this nature, in the
absence of an employer's testing program, it will be a rare claimant
who will have gathered sufficient test results prior to his death.
Given the 49-bb conditions, it is unlikely that an employee will
undergo and pay for tests either during employment, or prior to
the end of the six-month post-employment waiting period. So,
while 49-dd preserves the deceased's claim, 49-bb may make that
claim impossible to prove.
242. The maximum loss levels vary with the frequency of the sound, and differ
between men and women. H. DAVIS & R. SILVERMAN, HEARING AND DEAFNESS 110-13 (3d
ed. 1970).
243. 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 301.1 (b) (1974).
244. See note 232 supra.
245. See notes 221-22 supra & accompanying text.
246. This contrast is accentuated if 49-dd is interpreted to allow a claim even if the
employee dies before separation from work. See note 221 supra & accompanying text,
[Vol. 26
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
F. Federal Occupational Safety and Health Standards
Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)247 stan-
dards require that "protection against the effects of noise ex-
posure . . . be provided when sound levels exceed" ninety deci-
bels. 248 When "feasible administrative or engineering controls"
fail to reduce sound levels below those permitted, "personal pro-
tective equipment shall be provided and used to reduce sound
levels . ... -2 Employers must take reasonable steps to assure
that employees utilize the equipment provided.20 The equipment
must "provide adequate protection against the particular hazards
for which [it is] designed."251 Therefore, since the beginning of
1971, all employers have been required to provide their employees
with adequate ear protection when levels are exceeded .2 2 Avail-
able ear protectors can reduce the amount of sound that reaches
the ear by approximately thirty-five to sixty decibels.25 3
New York State regulations define occupational noise as harm-
ful when it reaches a level of eighty-five or more decibels.2c Since
the federally mandated ear protectors can reduce sound levels be-
low this figure, any employee who is required to wear ear pro-
tectors is no longer being exposed to "harmful noise" as that term
is used in New York. Therefore, there is a serious question of the
continued viability of 49-bb because employees who started work
after 1971, and are required by OSHA to wear ear protection, will
never be exposed to harmful noise. Furthermore, the amount of
auditory fatigue in those individuals who were exposed to harmful
noise prior to 1971 must be negligible.
G. Alternatives to the Present Scheme
If the waiting period is repealed, then some standard for de-
termining the date of disablement must be provided. One alterna-
247. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 to 700 (1970).
248. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (a) (1976).
249. Id. § 1910.95 (b) (I).
250. Secretary v. Allen Clark, Inc., 2 OS.H.A.R.C. 1145 (1973).
251. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.133 (a)(2)(i) (1976).
252. "'Employer' means a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has
employees, but does not include the United States or any State or any political sub-
division of a State." 29 U.S.C. § 625 (5) (1970).
253. Coles, Control of Industrial Noise Through Personal Protection, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE CONFERENCE: NOISE AS A PUBLIC HEALTH HAZARD 142 (1968) (A.S.H.A. Reports 4).
254. 12 N.Y.C.R.R. § 350.1, 1960 Report of Consultants on Industrial Noise and
Occupational Loss of Hearing, Answer to Question 1 (1974).
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tive might be to treat hearing loss as an occupational disease under
article 3. This would mean a return to the pre-article -A and pre-
Slawinski standard of wage loss255 as a prerequisite to filing a hear-
ing loss claim. Even though in most cases no actual wage loss
occurs from an occupational loss of hearing, it is not necessarily
true that no loss of earning capacity occurs when an individual
suffers a hearing impairment.
Collective bargaining and the protections afforded by union
membership appear to provide some guarantee that a union worker
with a hearing impairment will not actually receive lower wages
than a non-handicapped worker of the same class. Only one quarter
of all American workers are union members, however, and there
appears to be no protection for non-union members holding jobs
that require good hearing. Moreover, when a partially deaf em-
ployee seeks promotion, leaves his current job, looks for a job
outside his union classification, or is not a union member, his
earnings may well diminish or advancement may be denied.
Probably the primary reason that persons who cannot hear
well face difficulties in their work is their inability to hear instruc-
tions properly. The result may be a wasted double effort on the
part of the supervisor and the employee. Employers may also per-
ceive partially deaf individuals as greater safety risks than others
because of the partially deaf employee's diminished capacity to
hear warnings. When a partially deaf employee seeks opportunities
for advancement, similar problems may cost him the position he
seeks.
Thus, the future earnings of the partially deaf employee who
must change employers or who seeks advancement may be less
than that of a non-impaired employee. Such impaired individuals
would conceivably have sufficient arguments of "disability" to pre-
vail on a claim. No cogent lost earning capacity argument exists,
however, where an impaired employee does not change employers
or seek advancement. They would face the same proof problems
that 49-bb now causes.
Modern notions of what a workmen's compensation system
should provide do not support a return to a system of benefits that
are determined solely by the actual wage loss suffered by the em-
255. See note 225, supra. The phrase "actual wage loss" as used here does not in-




ployee. The National Commission on State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Laws recommended that awards of impairment benefits, in
addition to awards for actual lost wages, are appropriate in a
modern workmen's compensation program, even though such
awards are thought to be of secondary importance. "[M]any work-
ers with work-related injuries or diseases experience losses which
are not reflected in lost remuneration. Permanent impairment
involves lifetime effects on the personality and on normal activ-
ity."256
A simple test could be provided in place of the waiting period
of 49-bb. If an employee can show permanent loss of hearing due
to job-related noise exposure, he should have a right to compensa-
tion. The date of disablement would be the date that test results
first indicated some degree of permanent loss. Such a revision
would allow those workers who have suffered permanent occupa-
tional hearing losses, and who currently do not suffer from any
appreciable auditory fatigue because of the adequate ear protection
required by OSHA, to file claims and collect awards without the
proof problems caused by presbycusis. It would also provide an
incentive for those workers who are not covered by OSHA to
seek protective equipment for their ears, so that an accurate
determination of any permanent hearing loss could be made.
Mandatory employer-financed hearing tests would remove the
financial burden of testing from the employee. Adequate lag time
could be provided so that industry and insurance carriers could
set up reserves and collect premiums necessary to pay awards.
V. THE FEDERAL ALTERNATiVE
Many observers are concerned that the state workmen's com-
pensation systems are not working. The federal government has
responded to this concern by establishing the National Commission
on State Workmen's Compensation Laws1 57 Its stated purpose was
to conduct a "study and evaluation of State workmen's compensa-
tion laws in order to determine if such laws provide an adequate,
prompt, and equitable system of compensation. '258 The Commis-
sion's report found grave inadequacies in the present systems of
256. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 38.
257. 29 U.S.C. § 676 (b) (1970).
258. 29 U.S.C. § 676(d) (1) (1970).
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state workmen's compensation, and concluded that "State work-
men's compensation laws are in general neither adequate nor
equitable. '" 2 15  The Commission issued seventy-four recommenda-
tions for improvements to the state laws, nineteen of which it
called "essential."26°
259. NATIONAL COMsMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 25.
260. Id. at 26. The nineteen essential recommendations designated as such by the
Commission Report are as follows:
[1.] [Cloverage by workmen's compensation laws [should] be compulsory and no
waivers [should] be permitted.
[2.] ... [E]mployers [should] not be exempted from workmen's compensation cov-
erage because of the number of their employees.
[3.] .. . [A] two-stage approach [should be taken] to the coverage of farmworkers.
First, . . .as of July 1, 1973, each agricultural employer who has an annual
payroll that in total exceeds $1,000 [should] be required to provide workmen's
compensation coverage to all of his employees.
As a second stage .... as of July 1, 1975, farmworkers [should] be covered
on the same basis as all other employees.
[4.] ... [A]s of July 1, 1975, household workers and all casual workers [should]
be covered under workmen's compensation at least to the extent that they arc
covered by Social Security.
[5.] ... [W]orkmen's compensation [should] be mandatory for all government
employees.
[6.] .. . T]here [should] be no exemptions for any class of employees, such as
professional athletes or employees of charitable organizations.
[7.] - . . [Ain employee or his survivor [should] be given the choice of filing a
workmen's compensation claim in the State where the injury or death occurred,
or where the employment was principally localized, or where the employee was
hired.
[8.] . . . [A]Ul States [should] provide full coverage for work-related diseases.
[9.] ... Subject to the State's maximum weekly benefit, temporary total disabil-
ity benefits [should] be at least 662/ percent of the worker's gross weekly wage.
[10.] . . . [A]s of July 1, 1973, the maximum weekly benefit for temporary total
disability [should] be at least 662 percent of the State's average weekly wage,
and . . . as of July 1, 1975, the maximum [should] be at least 100 percent of the
State's average weekly wage.
[11.] . . . [T]he definition of permanent total disability used in most States
[should] be retained. However, in those few States which permit payment of
permanent total disability benefits to workers who retain substantial earning
capacity, . . . our benefit proposals [should] be applicable only to those cases
which meet the test of permanent total disability used in most States.
[12.] ...Subject to the State's maximum weekly benefit, permanent total dis-
ability benefits [should] be at least 662 percent of the worker's gross weekly
wage.
[13.] . . . [A]s of July 1, 1973, the maximum weekly benefit for permanent total
disability [should] be at least 66% percent of the State's average weekly wage,
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Despite the tremendous shortcomings that the Commission
noted in the state laws, the report rejected federalization as the
solution to the problem. 21' Nevertheless, in response to the report
two bills were introduced to Congress, one by Senator Harrison A.
Williams, Jr. (D-N.J.), the other by Senator Jacob K. Javits (R-
N.Y.) .262 If eventually enacted, such legislation "would end dec-
ades of sole state determination and supervision of the workmen's
compensation law and system. ' 263 Despite the Commission's rec-
ommendation against federalization of workmen's compensation,
Senator Javits contends that his proposed federal solution is con-
sistent with the report264 In brief, his proposal would entail the
establishment of the nineteen essential recommendations as mini-
mum federal standards. 2 5 These standards would automatically
and . . . as of July 1, 1975, the maximum [should] be at least 100 percent of the
State's average weekly wage.
[14.] . . . [T]otal disability benefits [should] be paid for the duration of the
worker's disability, or for life, without limitations as to dollar amount or time.
[15.] ... Subject to the State's maximum weekly benefit, death benefits [should]
be at least 662/3 percent of the worker's gross weekly wage.
[16.] . . . [A]s of July 1, 1973, the maximum weekly death benefit [should] be
at least 662/3 percent of the State's average weekly wage, and . . . as of July 1,
1975, the maximum [should] be at least 100 percent of the State's average
weekly wage.
[17.] ... [D]eath benefits [should] be paid to a widow or widower for life or
until remarriage, and in the event of remarriage, we recommend that two years'
benefits be paid in a lump sum to the widow or widower. . . . [B]enefits [should]
be continued at least until the child reaches 18, or beyond such age if actually
dependent, or at least until age 25 if enrolled as a full-time student in any ac-
credited educational institution.
[18.] . . . [IThere [should] be no statutory limits of time or dollar amount for
medical care or physical rehabilitation services for any work related impairment.
[19.] ... [T]he right to medical and physical rehabilitation benefits [should] not
terminate by the mere passage of time.
Id. at 45-48, 50, 60, 62-65, 71-72, 80 (recommendations 2.1, 22, 2.4-2.7, 2.11, 2.13, 3.7, 3.8,
3.11, 3.12, 3.15, 3.17, 3.21, 3.23, 3.25, 4.2 & 4.4).
261. NATIONAL COMrMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 26.
262. S. 2018, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 2008, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). See
H.R. 9431, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 8771, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (the
House counterparts of the Williams-Javits Senate bills). None of these bills were passed.
Imminent introduction of a bill which will continue in the tradition of S. 2018 and S.
2008 is expected. See Letter from Hon. Jacob K. Javits to Kenneth L. Gartner (February
21, 1977) (on fie at the offices of the BUFFALO LAW REViEW) .
263. Millus, Is Federalization of Workmen's Compensation Inevitable, 62 A.B.A.J.
1010 (1976).
264. 121 CoNG. REc. 11648 (1975) (remarks of Senator Javits).
265. S. 2018, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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become part of state law, enforceable in both state and federal
courts. Therefore, he argues, the recommendations would be
implemented through the framework of the individual state sys-
tems."6 Of course, critics of the bill take issue with this character-
ization, arguing that such a plan would relegate state agencies to
the role of "surrogates of the federal government. '21 7
Since workmen's compensation has traditionally been held as
a valued prerogative of the states, 0 " the spectre of federal action
has given new vitality to the debate over federal action versus
exclusive state control. To say that workmen's compensation is a
"state" problem which demands a "state" remedy begs the ques-
tion. The problem is pervasive and national in scope. Given the
general dissatisfaction with the current state systems,"" justifica-
tions for their continued existence must be found in their potential
for improved efficiency in achieving the original goals and purposes
of workmen's compensation. Doubt as to whether such improve-
ments are likely led the Commission Report to qualify its judg-
ment that the state system should be retained, by making it condi-
tional on state adoption of its recommendations.2 0 The central
issue then becomes whether the potential for effective state ad-
ministration can in fact be realized or whether some sort of federal
input is necessary.
The report's recommendations were essentially similar to
those which prior investigations had advanced and which failed to
receive strong support. 7 1 The report noted several reasons for
these past failures which suggest that pragmatic considerations are
likely to impede significant improvements to the state systems
unless some form of coercive federal legislation is forthcoming.
The report noted the following impediments to reform at the
state level:
266. 121 CONG. REc. 11648 (1975) (remarks of Senator Javits).
267. Wright & Rankin, Potential Federalization of State Workmen's Compensation
Laws-The Kansas Response, 15 WAsHBuRN LJ. 244, 272 (1976).
268. Mittelman, Workmen's Compensation Reform: The Prospects for Federal Action,
1970 ABA SECTION ON INS., NEG. AND Comp. LAw PROCEEDINGS 123, 126.
269. Millus, supra note 263, at 1011. See also NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 3, at 24-25; Dahl; Workmen's Compensation: New Federal Legislation, 10 TRIAL,
March/April 1974, at 50; Mittelman, supra note 268, at 123; Note, Proposed Federal
Workmen's Compensation Legislation: A Comparative View, 6 CASE W. REs. J. OF INT'L
L. 121, 121 (1978).




The lack of interest in or understanding of workmen's com-
pensation by State legislators and the general public is attributable
in part to the complexity of the program. Various interest groups,
including employers, unions, attorneys, and insurance carriers,
have often allowed their specialized concerns to stand in the way
of general reform. And State legislators and officials, even when
they have been genuinely interested in reform, have too often been
dissuaded by the irrational fear that the resulting increase in costs
would induce employers to transfer business to States with less
generous benefits and lower costs.
272
Although the Commission Report encouraged state legislatures to
improve their own compensation laws, it also recognized that new
recommendations for reform would not by themselves overcome
the forces that had compelled rejection of similar proposals in the
past. The report suggested that the states be given until 1975
to act before any kind of federal action was considered.
Senator Javits appeared to some to have jumped the gun by
introducing his proposed federalization in 1973.27' He justified
the timing of his proposal by saying that he was attempting to
strike a balance between "the momentum for reform created by
the Commission's report,"274 and the report's own recommenda-
tion that a delay be granted the states. The balance was to be
struck by a federal program that itself gave the states a reasonable
opportunity to comply with minimum federal standards. The
record of state reform since the Commission Report affirms the
wisdom of Senator Javits' attempt to capitalize on the momentum
for reform through federal action.
The Commission Report expressed the hope that the states'
fear of federalization would outweigh the countervailing fear of
business emigration which costly reforms might engender. Federal
legislation was viewed as a last resort if the threat of federalization
failed to induce reform at the state level.2 75 Since 1973, the states
have enacted some, but not all, of the report's recommendations.
And, while progress is being made, serious problems remain in
terms of the Commission Report's original findings.27 6 Now that
272. Id. (emphasis added).
273. Dahl, supra note 269, at 48.
274. Id. at 50.
275. NATIONAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 27; see Edwards, Workmen's
Compensation: The Need for Reform, 1973 U. OF ILL. L.F. 563, 577 (claiming that cost
increases are the greatest inhibitors of reform).
276. "There have been over 1300 bills introduced and 200 bills passed since the
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the waiting period has elapsed, the report's last resort, federaliza-
tion, should be considered as a serious alternative.
Pursuant to the recommendations of the Commission Report,
an Interdepartmental Policy Group was established by the Presi-
dent, and in May, 1974, published a White Paper on Workers'
Compensation. It recommended the formation of an Interdepart-
mental Workers' Compensation Task Force. 7  The Task Force was
constituted and, on January 19, 1977, transmitted its report to
the President and to Congress .27  This group recommended that
the states be given "a while longer" 79 to strengthen their workers'
compensation systems, stating that "[1]egislation to Federalize the
system is not warranted at this time. '2 0 The Task Force spe-
cifically endorsed the nineteen essential recommendations of the
National Commission,28' and further stated:
[W]e are convinced that some of the problems of workers' compen-
sation are severe enough to threaten the future of the system unless
the States set in motion some reforms that are more thorough
than would come from enacting the 19 essential recommendations
of the National Commission and nothing more.282
It is difficult to reconcile the Task Force's assertion that "it is time
to move beyond these recommendations," 283 with its suggestion
that the states be given "a while longer." 284 The impression given
is that the entire question of implementation is being shunted off
on a blind siding.
The Task Force Report indicated that the biggest problems
with the state systems were their structural and administrative
difficulties, rather than inadequate benefit levels.285 Consequently,
Report was published, but few of these enactments have dealt with the major recom-
mendations. Although there is now more window dressing, the real flaws in the system
still remain." Note, Proposed Federal Workmen's Compensation Legislation: A Comparative
View, 6 CASE W. RES. J. OF INT'L L. 121, 163 (1973) (footnotes omitted). See also Project,
Developments in Workers' Compensation Law, 53 J. OF URn. L. 755 (1976); POLIcY GRouP
OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKERS' COMPENSATION TASK FORCE, WORKEtS' COMPENSATION:
Is THERE A BETrER WAY?: REPORT To THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, 10 (1977) [here-
inafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
277. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 276.
278. Id. at 1.
279. Id. at 4.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 7.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 55.
284. Id. at 4.
285. Id. at 55.
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the Task Force considered the federal role in workmen's compensa-
tion as a resource of technical and financial assistance. But the Task
Force agreed that the goal of achieving universal compliance with
the Commission's essential recommendations is desirable.
If some form of federalization of the compensation systems is
necessary to achieve the goals established by the Commission, then
the federal role must consist not only of technical support, but
also of mandatory minimum standards.8 6 And as the years pass
without substantial improvement to the state compensation pro-
grams, it becomes ever more apparent that federalization may be
necessary. As Joseph Hoffmann, the Commissioner of the New
Jersey Department of Labor and Industry, stated: "Those who
argue in favor of permitting continuing diversity really beg the
question. The issue is compliance with minimal standards of
justice in the workmen's compensation system.
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286. Such legislation could, of course, leave much administrative control in the hands
2018, sitpra note 262 1121 CozG. REG. 11648 (1975) (remarks of Senator
I Workers' Compensation Standards Act: Hearings on S. 2008, S. 1029,
7 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Id Cong., 2d Sess. 2006 (1974) (statement of Joseph A. Hoffman, Com-
sey Department of Labor and Industry).

